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By Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin, and Heidi Williams *
We investigate whether private research investments are distorted 
away from long-term projects. Our theoretical model highlights two 
potential sources of this distortion: short-termism and the fixed pat-
ent term. Our empirical context is cancer research, where clinical 
trials—and hence, project durations—are shorter for late-stage can-
cer treatments relative to early-stage treatments or cancer preven-
tion. Using newly constructed data, we document several sources 
of evidence that together show private research investments are dis-
torted away from long-term projects. The value of life-years at stake 
appears large. We analyze three potential policy responses: surro-
gate (non-mortality) clinical-trial endpoints, targeted R&D subsi-
dies, and patent design. (JEL D92, G31, I11, L65, O31, O34)
Over the last five years, eight new drugs have been approved to treat lung cancer, 
the leading cause of US cancer deaths.1 All eight drugs targeted patients with the 
most advanced form of lung cancer, and were approved on the basis of evidence that 
the drugs generated incremental improvements in survival. A well-known example 
1 See the lists of US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved hematology/oncology drugs by year: 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/informationondrugs/approveddrugs/ucm279174.htm. 
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is Genentech’s drug Avastin, which was estimated to extend the life of late-stage 
lung cancer patients from 10.3 months to 12.3 months.2 In contrast, no drug has ever 
been approved to prevent lung cancer, and only six drugs have ever been approved to 
prevent any type of cancer. While this pattern could solely reflect market demand or 
scientific challenges, in this paper we investigate an alternative hypothesis: private 
firms may invest more in late-stage cancer drugs—and too little in early-stage can-
cer and cancer prevention drugs—because late-stage cancer drugs can be brought to 
market comparatively quickly, whereas drugs to treat early-stage cancer and to pre-
vent cancer require a much longer time to bring to market. More broadly stated, we 
investigate whether private firms differentially underinvest in long-term research, by 
which we mean technologies with long time lags between the initial spark of an idea 
and the availability of a commercially viable product. We document evidence that 
such underinvestment is quantitatively significant in an important context—treat-
ments for cancer—and analyze potential policy responses.
The idea that companies may be excessively focused on behaviors with short-run 
payoffs is an old one. A large policy- and practitioner-oriented literature has con-
jectured that managers may maximize short-term rather than long-term firm value 
(Porter 1992a,b; National Academy of Engineering 1992). In the academic litera-
ture, Stein (1989) and others have argued that firms may be more impatient than neo-
classical models would predict due to frictions such as agency problems within the 
firm. While such corporate short-termism has been widely discussed, little empirical 
evidence exists to either support or refute this view (see Stein 2003 for a survey and 
Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist 2015 for a more recent contribution).
We propose an additional reason why private firms may be particularly likely 
to focus on the short term in the context of research and development (R&D): the 
structure of the patent system.3 Patents award innovators a fixed period of market 
exclusivity (e.g., 20 years in the United States). Yet, since in many industries firms 
file patents at the time of discovery (“invention”) rather than first sale (“commer-
cialization”), effective patent terms vary: inventions that commercialize at the time 
of invention receive a full patent term, whereas inventions that have a long time 
lag between invention and commercialization receive substantially reduced—or in 
extreme cases, zero—effective patent terms. This means that the patent system pro-
vides, perhaps inadvertently, very little incentive for private firms to engage in long-
term research.4 Our theoretical model clarifies that, in fact, there is a sense in which 
2 Specifically, Avastin was approved for “unresectable, locally advanced, recurrent or metastatic non-squa-
mous NSCLC [non-small cell lung cancer]” patients and the clinical trial effectiveness estimate is posted on the 
Genentech website: http://www.gene.com/media/product-information/avastin-lung. As noted on the website, this is 
the first drug to extend median survival time for this patient population beyond 1 year. 
3 While the importance of patents has been debated in many industries, given our empirical focus on the phar-
maceutical industry it is worth noting that a variety of evidence suggests that patents play a key role in motivating 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, including industry interviews (Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner 1981; 
Mansfield 1986; Levin et al. 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000), the cost structure of new drug development 
relative to the generic production (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski 2003; Adams and Brantner 2006; Wroblewski 
et al. 2009), and the fact that standard investment models used by pharmaceutical firms pay close attention to effec-
tive patent length (Mayer Brown 2009). Informal interviews we conducted with venture capitalists for this paper 
also support this view, in the sense that these interviews highlighted the fixed term structure of the patent system as 
something that has important effects on research investments (see online Appendix C). 
4 It has long been recognized that heterogeneity across inventions—such as variation in risk-adjusted costs 
of development—implies that any given fixed patent term will award “too much” market exclusivity to some 
 inventions, and will be insufficient to motivate the development of others; on optimal patent length and optimal 
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corporate short-termism and fixed patent terms reinforce each other in distorting 
private research dollars away from long-term investments. The fixed patent term 
reduces the number of calendar years for which private firms enjoy monopoly pro-
tection on investments, and excess discounting reduces the weight the private firm 
places on each of those years relative to the societal weight.
The idea that firms may underinvest in long-term research, while intuitive, is dif-
ficult to test empirically. The key prediction is that there is “missing” private R&D 
on scientifically feasible projects that would be developed but for their long com-
mercialization lags. In practice, we do not observe the commercialization lags of 
projects that are never developed, and “missing” private R&D is hard to distinguish 
from alternative explanations such as a lack of market demand or a lack of scientific 
opportunities.
Two features of cancer markets allow us to make progress on quantifying this 
missing R&D. First, the treatment of cancer patients is organized around the organ 
(e.g., lung) and stage (e.g., metastatic) of disease, which provides a natural catego-
rization of both observed and potential R&D activity. Second, for each such group 
of cancer patients we observe a good predictor of how long it would take to com-
mercialize drugs for those patients: survival time. Survival time predicts commer-
cialization lags because a firm commercializing a new cancer drug must complete 
FDA-required clinical trials showing evidence that the drug is safe and effective; and, 
for cancer clinical trials, “effective” is usually interpreted as improving survival.5
To illustrate, consider two examples of clinical trials for prostate cancer treat-
ments, both published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2011. A first 
study, de Bono et al. (2011), analyzed a treatment for metastatic prostate cancer 
(an advanced stage of prostate cancer with a five-year survival rate on the order of 
20 percent). The study tracked patient survival for a median time of 12.8 months, and 
estimated statistically significant improvements in survival (a gain of 3.9 months of 
life). A second study, Jones et al. (2011), analyzed a treatment for localized prostate 
cancer (an early stage of prostate cancer with a five-year survival rate on the order 
of 80 percent). The study tracked patient survival for a median time of 9.1 years, 
estimating statistically significant improvements in survival. As expected, this stark 
difference in patient follow-up times translates into a large difference in clinical 
trial length: 3 years for the metastatic patient trial versus 18 years for the local-
ized patient trial. Consistent with the idea that commercialization lags differentially 
reduce private R&D incentives, the study of metastatic cancer patients was funded 
by a private firm (Cougar Biotechnology) whereas the study of localized cancer 
patients was funded by the National Cancer Institute.
We construct data on all clinical trials for cancer treatments over the period 
1973–2011, which we match to data on patient survival times over the same period. 
Our survival data is drawn from patient-level cancer registry data, which we aggre-
gate to cancer-stage-level patient groups. Our measure of cancer treatment R&D 
is newly constructed from a clinical trial registry that has cataloged cancer clinical 
patent breadth see, e.g., Machlup (1958); Nordhaus (1969, 1972); Scherer (1972); Kaplow (1984); Gilbert and 
Shapiro (1990); Klemperer (1990); and Scotchmer (1991). Relative to this literature, the patent analysis in our 
model highlights a simple—and, we think, important—specific form of heterogeneity in patent-provided incentives 
arising from commercialization lags that has potentially important consequences for welfare. 
5 There are exceptions to this general statement, which our empirical work will take advantage of. 
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trials since the 1970s. The key feature of these R&D data which enables our analy-
sis is that for each clinical trial, the registry lists each of the specific patient groups 
eligible to enroll in the trial—thus allowing a link between our measures of expected 
commercialization lag (survival time) and R&D activity (clinical trial investments) 
across cancer types and stages of disease.
Using this data, we document that, consistent with our conjectured distortion, 
patient groups with longer commercialization lags (as proxied by higher survival 
rates) tend to have lower levels of R&D investment. Panel A of  Figure 1 gives a sense 
of this basic pattern using stage-level data. On average, metastatic cancer patients 
have a five-year survival rate of approximately 10 percent, and have nearly 12,000 
clinical trials in our data. In contrast, localized cancer patients have a five-year sur-
vival rate of approximately 70 percent, and have just over 6,000 clinical trials in our 
data. This pattern is even more stark if we contrast recurrent cancers (advanced can-
cers with very poor survival prospects) and cancer prevention: fewer than 500 trials 
in our data aim to prevent cancer, whereas recurrent cancers have more than 17,000 
trials. A rough adjustment for market size—looking at the number of clinical trials 
per life-year lost from cancer—does little to change this basic pattern.
This new fact—a negative correlation between commercialization lags and R&D 
investments—is consistent with our conjectured distortion. However, by itself this 
fact is difficult to interpret for two reasons. First, this correlation need not reflect 
a causal relationship between commercialization lags and R&D investments. For 
example, if scientific opportunities are comparatively scarce for early-stage cancers, 
then a policy that shortened commercialization lags may have no effect on R&D 
investments. Second, even if this fact did reflect a causal effect of commercialization 
lags on R&D investments, on its own this fact need not be evidence of a distortion. 
As clarified by our theoretical model, the social planner is also more likely to pursue 
Figure 1. Survival Time and R&D Investments: Stage-Level Data 
Notes: This figure plots measures of clinical trial activity for each stage of cancer from 1973 to 2011. Panel A plots 
two measures of clinical trial activity for each stage of cancer from 1973 to 2011 against five-year survival rate 
among patients diagnosed with each stage between 1973–2004 (the cohorts for which five-year survival is uncen-
sored). The left-hand-side axis plots the number of clinical trials enrolling patients of each stage from 1973 to 
2011. The right-hand-side axis plots the number of clinical trials enrolling patients of each stage from 1973 to 2011 
divided by number of life-years lost—measured as age-gender-year specific life expectancy (in the absence of can-
cer) in the year of diagnosis, less observed survival time in years, averaged over patients diagnosed with that can-
cer-stage between 1973–1983 (to minimize censoring) multiplied by market size. Panel B is a bar chart plotting the 
same data for localized, regional, and metastatic cancers, but also including the number of trials for preventive tech-
nologies as well as in situ and recurrent cancers. For details on the sample, see the text and online Data Appendix.
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research projects that can be completed more quickly. To address these two con-
cerns, we document evidence from two complementary empirical tests.
First, we document causal evidence that shortening commercialization lags 
increases R&D investments. The key idea behind this test is to take advantage of 
the fact that some types of cancers are allowed to use surrogate endpoints (that is, 
non-mortality based clinical trial endpoints), which break the link between patient 
survival rates and clinical trial length. We document that there is not a negative 
relationship between survival time and R&D in the sample of cancers allowed to 
use surrogate endpoints. This suggests that our cross-sectional fact is unlikely to 
be explained by factors such as the pattern of available scientific opportunities. 
However, this test leaves open the possibility that the social planner and private 
firms symmetrically respond to commercialization lags, and thus does not provide 
direct evidence of a distortion.
Second, we contrast public and private R&D investments. Consistent with our 
model, we document that commercialization lags reduce both public and private 
R&D investments. But also consistent with our model—and consistent with the con-
jectured distortion—we document that the commercialization lag-R&D correlation 
is quantitatively and statistically significantly more negative for privately financed 
trials than for publicly financed trials.
As a complement to these empirical analyses, we also provide case study evi-
dence documenting that all six FDA-approved cancer prevention technologies— 
technologies that should have long commercialization lags, and hence should be 
affected by the conjectured distortion—either relied on the use of surrogate end-
points or were approved on the basis of publicly financed clinical trials. That is, with 
the exception of a few instances where surrogate endpoints were able to be utilized, 
there have been zero privately developed chemoprevention drugs. Taken together, 
this body of evidence provides support for the idea that commercialization lags dis-
tort private R&D investments.
Our theoretical model describes two potential mechanisms for our empirical 
results—corporate short-termism and the patent distortion—but our results do not 
speak to which mechanism is quantitatively more important. The existing literature 
also provides little insight into the expected magnitudes of either mechanism. On 
one hand, the corporate finance literature has struggled to devise tests for the pres-
ence of short-termism bias, in part because the key theoretical implications often 
focus on behaviors that by construction are undertaken by managers but unobserved 
by the market. Perhaps most closely related is Bernstein (forthcoming), who docu-
ments that public firms pursue lower “quality” R&D than privately held firms, but 
he lacks a direct measure of commercialization lags. On the other hand, the innova-
tion literature has provided remarkably little evidence that stronger patent protec-
tion induces more R&D investments. For example, Lerner (2002) and Sakakibara 
and Branstetter (2001) find little evidence that stronger intellectual property rights 
induce more R&D.6
6 While the prior innovation literature has primarily focused on how patents affect the level of R&D, note that 
our model suggests a mechanism through which the structure of the patent system may also have important effects 
on the direction of R&D. This idea has been discussed by several legal scholars (Eisenberg 2005; Abramowicz 
2007; Roin 2010), but to the best of our knowledge has not previously been formally investigated either theoreti-
cally or empirically. 
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We use our theoretical model to analyze the innovation and social welfare con-
sequences of three policy levers that could address this distortion: allowing firms to 
rely on surrogate endpoints in clinical trials, a patent design change that would start 
the patent clock at commercialization, and R&D subsidies targeting projects with 
long commercialization lags. Two aspects of this analysis are important to high-
light. First, surrogate endpoints have benefits beyond just eliminating the distortion, 
because the social planner also values completing projects more quickly. Second, 
patent reforms would address only the distortion generated by patents, and would 
not address the distortion generated by corporate short-termism. Given that our 
empirical work does not quantify the relative importance of corporate short-termism 
and patents, our analysis of patent reforms as a policy lever should be considered 
suggestive rather than conclusive.
Our empirical focus on cancer treatments is of substantive interest because of 
cancer’s tremendous morbidity and mortality burden. In 2009, cancer was the sec-
ond leading cause of death in the United States (after heart disease), accounting 
for almost 25 percent of all deaths. Using an economic framework which values 
improvements in health based on individuals’ willingness to pay, Murphy and Topel 
(2006) estimate that a permanent 1 percent reduction in cancer mortality has a pres-
ent value to current and future generations of Americans of nearly $500 billion, 
and that a cure (if feasible) would be worth about $50 trillion. Taking advantage 
of our surrogate endpoint variation, we estimate counterfactual R&D allocations 
and induced improvements in cancer survival rates that would have been observed 
if commercialization lags were reduced. Based on these counterfactuals, we esti-
mate that among one cohort of patients—US cancer patients diagnosed in 2003—
longer commercialization lags generated around 890,000 lost life-years; valued at 
$100,000 per life-year lost (Cutler 2004), the estimated value of these lost life-years 
is on the order of $89 billion.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents the model. Section II describes 
our data. Section III documents the negative correlation between survival time and 
R&D investments, and Section IV interprets this relationship. Section V derives a 
back-of-the-envelope estimate of the life-years lost due to longer commercialization 
lags. Section VI concludes.
I. Theory
We conceptualize R&D as consisting of two stages: invention and commercial-
ization. By invention we mean developing the basic idea for a product to the point 
where it is patentable: producing a new chemical compound, building a prototype, 
etc. By commercialization we mean all that is involved in bringing an invented prod-
uct to market: getting FDA approval for the new chemical compound, producing 
the prototyped good at efficient scale, etc. The commercialization lag of an R&D 
project is the amount of time between invention and commercialization.
Our purposefully simple model shows why private-sector R&D may be distorted 
away from inventions with long commercialization lags. Note importantly that 
both private and social R&D incentives decline with commercialization lag—all 
else equal, both firms and society prefer inventions to come to market quickly. But, 
due to either excessive discounting or the fixed patent term, private incentives will 
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decline more rapidly than social incentives, which is what gives rise to the distor-
tion. Our model also analyzes three potential policy interventions which can be used 
to address this distortion.
Reflecting our empirical setting we focus the model on the pharmaceutical indus-
try, though our analysis applies more broadly.
A. Preliminaries
A representative firm conducts undirected R&D which stochastically yields 
inventions. Whenever the firm’s undirected R&D yields an invention, it then must 
decide whether to invest directed R&D toward the goal of commercializing the spe-
cific invention. An invention is characterized by the following parameters:
Timing Parameters.—The year in which the invention is realized by the firm’s 
undirected R&D is  t invent , which we normalize to zero. The number of years that the 
commercialization effort will take is  t comm , which we call commercialization lag. 
In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, commercialization lags arise both in 
research and in clinical development; to fix ideas, think of  t comm as the number of 
years that it will take to conduct US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-required 
clinical trials. We treat  t comm and several other parameters below as deterministic for 
simplicity; in practice many of the parameters would be stochastic.
Cost of Commercialization.—If the firm elects to commercialize the invention 
it incurs commercialization costs of  c . For simplicity, we treat commercialization 
costs as a one-time cost incurred at time  t invent .7 Conceptually, we think of the firm as 
deciding at time  t invent whether to allocate capital to the project, e.g., in pharmaceu-
ticals, the firm decides at time  t invent whether to invest in conducting clinical trials.
Likelihood of Successful Commercialization.—The commercialization effort 
yields a commercially viable product with probability  p . The success parameter  p 
can be interpreted as the likelihood that FDA clinical trials are successful.
Obsolescence Risk.—If the product is successfully commercialized, then it is 
useful until superseded. We model obsolescence risk in a simple way, assuming that 
obsolescence occurs with probability  1 − γ per year in each year following  t invent .8 
Obsolescence risk would more appropriately be modeled as an endogenous parame-
ter (for example, a function of R&D investments); for simplicity we follow much of 
7 An alternative approach would be to interpret  c as the net present value of costs that are incurred over  t comm 
years, but this raises the issue of which discount factor to use for the purpose of computing this net present value—
the neoclassical discount factor  δ or the short-termism discount factor  ηδ . Treating costs as incurred at time  t invent 
circumvents this issue, and captures the idea that clinical trials require similar financial resources whether they are 
funded by a private firm or the government. Our approach also abstracts from staged investment and the associated 
real-option considerations which, while important, are not directly related to the goals of our model: see, e.g., 
Gompers (1995) and Neher (1999) for analyses of staged financing. 
8 An alternative would be to incorporate obsolescence that occurs before  t comm into the probability of commer-
cialization success  p , and only use the term obsolescence to describe cases where the product is superseded after 
successful commercialization at  t comm . This is economically equivalent, but less convenient mathematically; see 
especially formula (1) below. 
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the previous patent theory literature in taking obsolescence risk as exogenous (e.g., 
Grossman and Lai 2004).9
Monopoly Profits and Social Value.—If the product is successfully commercial-
ized, non-obsolete, and protected by patent, it yields profits of  π per year to the invent-
ing firm, and social value of  v monop per year.10 If the product were priced by a social 
planner instead of a monopolist, it would yield social value of  v >  v monop per year.
Imitability.—If the product is successfully commercialized, non-obsolete, and 
not protected by patent, generic entrants may imitate the commercialized product.11 
Imitation reduces the inventing firm’s profits from  π to  (1 − ι)π , where  ι ∈ [0, 1] 
denotes the imitability of the product (that is, vulnerability to generic competition). 
The case  ι = 1 corresponds to perfect imitability, which drives the inventing firm’s 
profits to zero. We focus on  ι = 1 for most of the analysis, but note that even in 
pharmaceuticals generic entry sometimes does not drive profits all the way to zero 
(see Bronnenberg et al. 2013).
Discounting and Excess Impatience.—The project’s neoclassical risk-adjusted 
discount rate is  r . Following Stein (2003), corporate short-termism can be modeled 
as an excessive private-sector discount rate. For mathematical convenience we work 
with discount factors instead of discount rates, so corporate  short-termism is reflected 
as a lower discount factor. Specifically, society applies the  obsolescence-risk-weighted 
discount factor  δ = γ/(1 + r) , whereas private firms apply the discount factor  ηδ , 
with  η ≤ 1 . The  η term reflects excess impatience due to corporate short-termism.
Patent Term and Timing of Patent Filing.—In a fixed-term patent system, patents 
for new inventions last  t patent years from the filing date.12 So long as an invention 
is protected by patent, imitation is illegal. Firms may choose whether to file for 
patent protection at the time of invention  t invent or at the time of commercialization 
t comm . If they file at the time of invention they receive patent protection with prob-
ability 1. If they wait until commercialization to file they receive patent protection 
with  probability  q ≤ 1 , reflecting the risk of disclosure, losing an R&D race, etc. 
Pharmaceutical firms face very strong incentives to file patents at the time of inven-
tion (Wegner and Maebius 2001; Galli and Faller 2003; Schreiner and Doody 2006): 
9 Across industries, many inventions become obsolete long before their patents expire (Schankerman and 
Pakes 1986). However, this is generally not the case in the pharmaceutical industry, as many drugs are still in use 
long after their initial FDA approval date and generate significant sales revenues near the end of their patent term 
(Grabowski and Kyle 2007). 
10 A natural alternative assumption would be to model profits as endogenous to entry, since more competition 
could result in lower profits. We do not focus on this possibility here given that in our context, this would cut against 
our distortion: projects with short commercialization lags should have more entry, and be lower profit, which would 
in turn lower incentives for subsequent entry. Given that our data suggest that this dynamic is not sufficiently strong 
to offset our main finding—that projects with short commercialization lags have more entry—we focus on an exog-
enous profit parameter for simplicity. 
11 In the pharmaceutical industry, generic manufacturers are usually poised to enter the market as soon as patents 
expire (Grabowski and Kyle 2007; Hemphill and Sampat 2012). Such formal analyses are consistent with anecdotal 
evidence that industry analysts, and, e.g., the Wall Street Journal, closely track patent expirations in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, and these patent expirations tend to result in sharp changes in the profitability of branded drugs. 
12 We here abstract away from the provisions of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, which awards some qualifying 
pharmaceutical firms extended patent terms; we discuss such policy levers in Section IE. 
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delaying risks a competitor patenting first, or subsequent disclosures undermining 
the drug’s novelty or non-obviousness for purposes of patentability (Thomas 2007; 
Patrick 2005; Zanders 2011).13 In practice, firms almost always have possession of 
the core patents over their drugs before entering clinical trials (Mossinghoff 1999; 
Patrick 2005; Thomas 2007).14 For this reason we focus on the case of  q = 0 for 
most of the analysis.
B. Effective Monopoly Life and Effective Total Life
We define an invention’s Effective Monopoly Life (EML) as the expected num-
ber of years, in present value terms as discounted by the private firm, that the firm 
can expect to earn monopoly profits from the commercialized product. This is the 
expected amount of time that the invention is commercially viable, protected by 
patent, and not yet superseded. We focus our analysis on the case of inventions that 
are imitable if not protected by patent ( ι = 1 ) and where firms must file for patent 
protection at invention in order to receive patent protection ( q = 0 ). This is the 
most relevant case for the pharmaceutical industry; below we discuss other cases.
If  t patent >  t comm then EML can be written as
(1)  EML = p ∑ 
 t comm 
 
 t patent −1
 (ηδ ) t = p   (ηδ)  
 t comm  − (ηδ)   t patent    ______________ 
1 − ηδ  . 
The key thing to notice about equation (1) is the role of the timing parameters: 
at best, the period of monopoly is from  t comm to  t patent . This best case occurs if the 
invention is successfully commercialized (which occurs with probability  p ) and not 
superseded as of time  t patent (obsolescence risk is incorporated into  δ ). As soon as 
time reaches  t patent , the invention will be imitated and the monopoly position lost. 
Note as well that if  t patent ≤  t comm , then  EML = 0 : by the time the invention is 
commercialized, patent protection has expired.
Next, we define an invention’s Effective Total Life (ETL) as the expected number 
of years, in present value terms as discounted by society, that the invention will be 
commercialized and non-obsolete,
(2)  ETL = p ∑ 
 t comm 
 
∞
 δ t = p  δ   t comm   _____
1 − δ  . 
There are two differences between EML and ETL. First, monopoly life runs at best 
until  t patent , whereas total life runs indefinitely until the invention becomes obsolete. 
13 Zanders (2011, pp. 322–23), for example, argues: “A question that is often raised during my courses is ‘why 
don’t companies wait as long as possible before patenting?’ This is tempting, but given the fluid nature of employ-
ment in the industry and the general leakiness of information, this would be tantamount to commercial suicide.” 
14 Although the law is not settled, FDA clinical trials most likely constitute a public disclosure of the drug; see 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2004), opinion vacated and superseded, 
403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The SmithKline decision held that a drug’s use in clinical trials puts it in the public 
domain, but since that opinion was vacated and the court decided the case on other grounds, the state of the law here 
is unclear. Once an invention is in the public domain, the inventing firm must file for patent protection within one 
year of public disclosure else they lose the right to patent (35 USC. 102). 
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Second, monopoly life is measured according to the private-sector discount factor 
ηδ whereas total life is measured according to the social discount factor  δ .
If the invention is not perfectly imitable ( ι < 1 ) then the formula for EML would 
need to be modified to account for the fact that profits do not fall all the way to zero 
at  t patent .15 In the extreme case of zero imitability ( ι = 0 ) and zero short-termism 
( η = 1 ), EML and ETL coincide. If the invention has  q that is not only strictly 
positive but sufficiently large, then the formula for EML would need to be modified 
to account for the fact that firms may choose to file for patent protection at  t comm 
rather than  t invent .16 In this case, the period of monopoly protection runs from  t comm 
to  t comm +  t patent , but the firm enjoys a successful, patent-protected invention with 
probability of just  pq rather than  p .
C. Private and Social Incentives to Invest
A profit-maximizing firm attempts to commercialize an invention if and only if 
the expected profits exceed the costs,
(3)  Private Investment Occurs ⇔ EML · π ≥ c . 
In words, the firm can expect to enjoy monopoly profits of  π for EML years. If 
EML · π exceeds the costs of commercialization  c , it is optimal to commercialize.
Suppose instead that society owned the firm. If commercialization is successful, 
the social planner will price at marginal cost, and hence create social welfare of  v per 
year. Hence the social planner attempts to commercialize the invention if and only 
if expected social welfare, if the good is priced at marginal cost, exceeds the costs 
of commercialization,
(4)  Investment is Socially Optimal ⇔ ETL · v ≥ c . 
Notice that  ETL ≥ EML and  v ≥ π by definition. By construction, this ignores 
issues such as business stealing and R&D races which, although important, are not 
the focus of our analysis.17 Thus, in our framework, anytime a private firm would 
choose to commercialize an invention, so too would the social planner. The projects 
that the private firm does not pursue, but that society would pursue if it owned the 
firm, are those where
(5)  Private and Social Investment Differ ⇔  EML · π _______c ≤ 1 ≤  ETL · v ______c  . 
In words, private and social investment decisions differ when the social return is 
positive but the private return is negative. The private market can under-provide 
R&D if either  EML/ETL < 1 or  π/v < 1 .
15 The modified formula becomes  EML = p ( ∑  t comm   t patent −1 (ηδ ) t + (1 − ι) ∑  t patent  ∞ (ηδ ) t ) . 
16 The specific condition to check to see whether firms prefer to patent at  t invent or  t comm is which is larger of 
 p ∑  t comm   t patent −1 (ηδ ) t or  pq ∑  t comm   t comm + t patent −1 (ηδ ) t . Clearly, the former is larger for sufficiently small  q (as is the case in phar-
maceuticals) and the latter is larger for sufficiently large  q . 
17 Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) provide a recent analysis estimating the magnitude of business 
stealing. 
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D. Distortions in the Level and Composition of R&D
Our model yields distortions, relative to the social optimum, in both the level and 
composition of commercialization activity. By distortion in level, we mean simply 
that fewer inventions are commercialized by private firms than would be the case if 
the social planner made commercialization decisions. This is a standard result. By 
distortion in composition, we mean that the private market may choose to commer-
cialize A but not B, while a social planner would prefer to commercialize B over A. 
That is, the private sector not only pursues too little R&D relative to the social opti-
mum, but also chooses the wrong projects relative to what the social planner would 
choose. We state this formally as follows:18
PROPOSITION 1: The private firm’s commercialization activity differs from the 
social optimum in both the level and the composition:
 (i) (Distortion in levels) Commercialization activity is strictly lower than socially 
optimal, unless (i) patent terms are infinite (i.e.,  t patent = ∞ ); (ii) firms are 
not excessively impatient (i.e.,  η = 1 ); and (iii) monopolists capture full 
social surplus (i.e.,  π = v ).
 (ii) (Distortion in composition) For two inventions,  A and  B , it is possible that 
the expected social return ( ETL · v/c ) to pursuing invention  A exceeds that 
of invention  B , yet invention  A is not pursued while invention  B is. For this to 
be the case, at least one of the following must hold:19
  (a)   π B / v B >  π A / v A , i.e., monopolists capture more profit as a proportion of 
potential social value from invention  B than from invention  A .
  (b)   EM L B /ET L B > EM L A /ET L A , i.e., the ratio of monopoly life to total use-
ful life is larger for invention  B than for invention  A .
As noted above, Part 1 of Proposition 1 is a standard result, which indicates that 
the private sector pursues too little inventive activity relative to the first best. Part 2 
of Proposition 1 indicates that distortions in composition can arise from differences 
across inventions in either  π/v or  EML/ETL .
An invention’s profitability to social value ratio  π/v depends on the monop-
olist’s ability to capture the value its invention creates.20 One extreme case is 
if the monopolist can perfectly price discriminate, in which case  π/v = 1 . 
The other extreme case is inventions that are non-excludable, in which case 
π/v = 0 . An example of the latter is a study on a non-excludable form of disease 
18 Proofs are presented in online Appendix A. 
19 We use subscripts  A and  B to denote the project-specific parameters associated with these specific inventions 
(e.g.,  π A is the monopoly profits associated with successful commercialization of invention  A ). 
20 Past authors have estimated that on the whole, pharmaceutical firms appropriate only a small share of the 
social value of their innovations—generally between 2–20 percent (Philipson and Jena 2006; Lakdawalla et al. 
2010; Lindgren and Jonsson 2012). Nordhaus (2004) estimates that this general conclusion holds outside of the 
pharmaceutical industry as well, arguing that only a minuscule fraction of the social returns from technological 
advances over the 1948–2001 period was captured by producers. 
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prevention: e.g., a profit-maximizing firm would never conduct an expensive clinical 
trial to test whether a particular pattern of cardiovascular exercise reduces the risk of 
heart disease, because knowledge that a specific pattern of exercise reduces the risk 
of heart disease is non-excludable.
An invention’s monopoly-life to total-life ratio,  EML/ETL , describes the propor-
tion of the invention’s total useful life in which the private firm enjoys monopoly 
profits. Our central point is that an invention’s  EML/ETL ratio declines with com-
mercialization lag  t comm , due to both short-termism and the fixed patent term. To see 
this, write out the expression for  EML/ETL assuming that  t comm ≤  t patent :
(6)  EML _____ETL =  
p  (ηδ)  
 t comm  − (ηδ)   t patent    ____________
1 − ηδ   _____________ 
p  δ   t comm   ____
1 − δ 
 =  1 − δ _____
1 − ηδ ( η 
 t comm  −  η  t patent    δ  t patent − t comm  ) .
Notice, first, that if  η = 1 and  t patent = ∞ (there is no short-termism and pat-
ent length is infinite), then  EML/ETL = 1 for all  t comm  . 21 Commercialization lag 
reduces incentives to invest, but it reduces both private and social incentives to invest 
at exactly the same rate.
Notice, too, that if  η = 1 and  t patent =  t comm + k , that is, the patent term is 
finite but with the patent clock modified to start at commercialization, not invention 
(recall that we have normalized  t invent = 0 ), then  EML/ETL again doesn’t vary with 
t comm .  EML is strictly less than  ETL under this patent design, but, just as with infinite 
patents, commercialization lag reduces private and social incentives at exactly the 
same rate.
However, if either  η < 1 or the patent term is finite and starts at invention, then 
EML/ETL declines with  t comm . The decline in private incentives is more rapid than 
the decline in social incentives.
PROPOSITION 2: Comparative statics of an invention’s proportion of monopoly 
life to total life,  EML/ETL , on its commercialization lag,  t comm :
 (i) If there is no short-termism ( η = 1 ) and the patent term is either 
infinite ( t patent = ∞ ) or is finite but the clock starts at commercialization 
( t patent =  t comm + k for finite  k ), then the ratio of monopoly life to total life, 
EML/ETL , is constant in  t comm :  ∂ (EML/ETL)/∂  t comm = 0 .
 (ii) If firms are excessively impatient ( η < 1 ) or the patent term is finite and 
starts at invention,  EML/ETL is decreasing in  t comm .
  (a) If  t comm <  t patent the decline is strict:  ∂ (EML/ETL)/ ∂  t comm < 0 .
  (b) If  t comm ≥  t patent then  EML = 0 . Hence  EML/ETL = 0 .
21 Recall that while our analysis focuses on the case of perfect imitability ( ι = 1 ), an economically equivalent 
condition to  t patent = ∞ is if  ι = 0 . We discuss imperfect imitability in Section IE. 
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This result, in combination with Proposition 1, shows that private-sector R&D is 
particularly distorted away from R&D projects with long commercialization lags, 
relative to projects with shorter commercialization lags. Moreover, there is a sense 
in which the effect of excess impatience on  ∂ (EML/ETL)/ ∂  t comm and the effect of 
the fixed patent term on  ∂ (EML/ETL)/ ∂  t comm reinforce each other. The fixed patent 
term means that increasing  t comm by one year reduces the number of calendar years 
of monopoly life by one year. Excess discounting means that the private firm places 
too little weight on each of these years of monopoly life relative to their societal 
value. To see this decomposition formally, define an invention’s effective patent life 
as  EPL = p ∑  t comm   t patent −1 δ t = p(δ   t comm  − δ   t patent  )/(1 − δ) ;  EPL is  EML but using the 
social discount factor  δ . We can decompose  EML/ETL into an excessive discount-
ing term and a fixed patent term as
(7)  EML _____
ETL =   
EML _____
EPL   ⏟excess discounting ·   
EPL ____
ETL  ⏟fixed patents .
It is easy to see that both terms in this decomposition are strictly declining with 
commercialization lag:
PROPOSITION 3: Decomposition of  ∂ (EML/ETL)/ ∂  t comm into the effect of excess 
discounting and the effect of the fixed patent term:
 (i) If there is excess discounting,  η < 1 , then  ∂ (EML/EPL)/ ∂  t comm < 0 for 
t comm <  t patent .
 (ii) If there is a fixed patent term—a finite patent clock that starts at invention—
then  ∂ (EPL/ETL)/ ∂  t comm < 0 for  t comm <  t patent .
Two hypothetical examples can illustrate this distortion in the composition of 
R&D. A vaccine administered to men at age 20 which prevented prostate cancer 
(which tends to affect men in their fifties or later) would have a high social value  v 
(given the high morbidity and mortality burden of prostate cancer), but would have 
a low (or zero)  EML/ETL ratio because of the long required clinical trials. In con-
trast, a drug administered to late-stage prostate cancer patients which extended life 
from, say, six months to eight months, would have a lower social value  v , but a high 
EML/ETL ratio because of the short required clinical trials. Note that in the case of 
these examples, our distortion of interest—generated by the difference in  EML/ETL 
ratios—would be reinforced by differences in  π/v .
E. Policy Responses
Our empirical work will provide support for the idea that private-sector R&D 
activity is distorted away from projects with long commercialization lags. Given 
that evidence, in this subsection we discuss the innovation and social welfare con-
sequences of three policy interventions that could be used to address this distortion: 
a policy change that would allow firms to rely on surrogate (non-mortality) end-
points in clinical trials; a patent design change that would start the patent clock at 
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 commercialization; and targeted R&D subsidies. Some readers may prefer to skip 
this section on a first reading, returning to our analysis of policy responses after 
reading the empirical analysis.
Policy Lever: Surrogate Endpoints.—A major factor determining the duration of 
a clinical trial is the amount of time needed to observe statistically significant dif-
ferences in treatment outcomes among enrolled patients, known as the “follow-up 
period.” The length of the follow-up period largely depends on two factors: the nat-
ural progression of the disease, and the clinical trial endpoints required by govern-
ment regulators.
Prior to marketing a new drug, firms must submit clinical trial results to the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) documenting that their product meets a set of 
safety and efficacy standards. Over time, the FDA’s interpretation of which clinical 
trial endpoints can be used to support claims that a drug is effective have varied (see, 
e.g., Johnson, Williams, and Pazdur 2003). Conventionally, clinical trials evaluate 
whether a candidate product provides a clinical benefit to mortality—be it overall 
survival or a closely related measure such as “disease free survival,” which measures 
time until cancer recurrence. However, in recent years there has been increased 
interest in using surrogate endpoints as a substitute for the standard clinical end-
points in a drug trial. In the case of hypertension, for example, lower blood pres-
sure is accepted as a surrogate for the clinical endpoint of preventing cardiovascular 
complications (Lee et al. 2006). As we discuss in Section IVA, blood cell counts and 
related measures have been accepted surrogate endpoints for hematologic malignan-
cies (leukemias and lymphomas).
Surrogate endpoints have the potential to dramatically reduce the length of clini-
cal trials necessary to test whether a drug is effective. However, surrogate endpoints 
have also been extremely controversial. As described by Fleming (2005), although 
treatment effects on surrogate endpoints clearly establish some form of biological 
activity, changes in surrogate endpoints may not correlate with changes in the clini-
cal endpoint of interest. As an example, he discusses prostate specific antigen (PSA) 
levels: although PSA levels are correlated with the extent of prostate cancer, the 
PSA level itself is not a mechanism through which prostate cancer progresses, and 
thus it is unknown whether a treatment that reduced PSA levels in prostate cancer 
patients would generate improvements in survival.22 Reflecting this type of concern, 
most cancers use surrogate endpoints only on a limited, somewhat ad hoc basis.23
22 A non-cancer example of the controversy around surrogate endpoints arose recently in the context of treat-
ments for early-stage Alzheimer’s disease. In a 2013 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, two FDA 
officials discussed the possibility of accepting new types of surrogate endpoints in clinical trials of treatments for 
early-stage Alzheimer’s disease (Kozauer and Katz 2013)—a proposal that was sharply criticized by the editorial 
board of the New York Times (“Drugs for Early-Stage Alzheimer’s,” March 18, 2013), among others. 
23 As discussed by US Food and Drug Administration (2007) and Johnson, Williams, and Pazdur (2003), since 
1992 the FDA’s accelerated approval regulations have allowed for the following: for diseases that are serious or 
life-threatening, a drug can be FDA approved based on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict 
clinical benefit but is not established at a level that would support regular approval, under the condition that the 
applicant is required to perform a post-marketing study to demonstrate that treatment with the drug is indeed sup-
ported with clinical benefit. If the subsequent trials fail to demonstrate clinical benefit, or if the applicant does not 
conduct the required studies, the FDA can act quickly to remove the drug from the market. A recent President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2012) report argued that the FDA should expand this accelerated 
approval program. 
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In the context of our model, surrogate endpoints can be conceptualized as strictly 
reducing commercialization lag  t comm : firms can always choose to use survival as 
an endpoint, and we assume that the surrogate endpoint can be observed strictly 
earlier than the survival outcome. For simplicity, we analyze the effect of an “ideal” 
surrogate endpoint—one that perfectly correlates with the true clinical outcome of 
interest. This assumption allows us to make the following simple point.
PROPOSITION 4: Allowing surrogate endpoints:
 (i) Strictly increases commercialization activity: some inventions that would not 
otherwise have been commercialized now are, and all inventions that would 
be commercialized even without surrogate endpoints still are.
 (ii) Strictly increases firm profits and social welfare.
 (iii) Let  t ̂comm denote commercialization lag, in the absence of a surrogate end-
point, based on the time required to show an effect on patient mortality. Let 
t comm <  t ̂comm denote the commercialization lag if surrogate endpoints are 
allowed. If  t comm is independent of  t ̂comm , that is, if the time required to show 
impacts on the surrogate endpoint is independent of the time required to 
show impacts on mortality, then allowing surrogate endpoints eliminates the 
distortion in composition associated with commercialization lag absent the 
surrogate endpoint:  ∂E ( EML ____ETL  |  t ̂comm = x ) /∂x = 0 .
Clearly this proposition is based on a strong assumption of the existence of an 
ideal surrogate endpoint. Our objective here is simply to show that there would 
be social welfare benefits from the scientific discovery, validation, and allowance 
of valid surrogate endpoints.24 Note that surrogate endpoints are valuable both 
because they eliminate the distortion in composition of R&D and because, even in 
the absence of a distortion, it is socially valuable to complete R&D projects sooner.
Patent Design.—In this section we discuss modifications to the fixed term patent 
design that address the distortion away from long-term R&D projects. Note, impor-
tantly, that the patent design policy response differs from our other policy responses 
in that it addresses only the fixed patent term as a source of distortion, and not exces-
sive discounting. As we will discuss below, if patents are unimportant for motivating 
R&D (formally, imitability  ι is zero), the patent design policy response will not be 
effective at addressing the distortion of interest, but in our simple framework this 
policy reform would also not be harmful.25
24 The use of invalid surrogate endpoints could increase R&D investments but not generate any corresponding 
gains in survival. In the specific empirical context we analyze in Section IVA, we will document evidence that sur-
rogate endpoints for hematologic cancers appear to have increased R&D investments, and that this increase in R&D 
investments appears to have translated into real improvements in patient health. 
25 Our model focuses on a Nordhaus (1969)-style trade-off between the incentives for developing a new innova-
tion and the deadweight loss of higher prices during the life of the patent. By construction, this type of framework 
abstracts away from other ways in which patent reforms could impact social welfare, including business stealing, 
the effects of patents on follow-on innovation, litigation, or the benefits of the disclosure function of the patent 
system. 
2059Budish et al.: do firms underinvest in long-term research?vol. 105 no. 7
We begin with a simple result, analogous to part (i) of Proposition 2, that shows 
that starting the patent clock at commercialization, rather than invention, eliminates 
the distortion in composition arising from the patent system.
PROPOSITION 5: If the patent clock starts at commercialization, i.e.,  t patent 
=  t comm + x for fixed and finite  x , then  EPL/ETL is independent of commercializa-
tion lag,  t comm .
If we make some admittedly stylized assumptions on the distribution of invention 
possibilities, we can make a stronger claim, which is that starting the patent clock at 
commercialization strictly increases social welfare. In fact, the result says we should 
go further: social welfare is maximized by awarding more post-commercialization 
patent life to inventions with longer commercialization lag than inventions with 
shorter commercialization lag, in contrast to the current system which awards inven-
tions with longer commercialization lag less post-commercialization patent life than 
inventions with shorter lag.
PROPOSITION 6: Make the following assumptions about the distribution of inven-
tion parameters:  δ < 1 and  η ≤ 1 are constant across inventions, so that  EML 
varies only with commercialization lag  t comm , patent life  t patent , and success prob-
ability  p ; the social-to-private value ratios  v/π and  v monop /π are constant across 
inventions; the density of inventions on the extensive margin, i.e., the expected num-
ber of new inventions elicited by a marginal increase in  t patent , is uniform; and, the 
expectation of costs,  c , conditional on an invention being at the margin, is weakly 
increasing in  t comm . Suppose that private firms make commercialization decisions 
according to equation (3). Suppose that the length of the patent award can be con-
ditioned on  t comm but not on the other invention parameters. Then socially optimal 
patent policy requires that the number of years of post-commercialization patent 
protection increases monotonically with  t comm , whereas under the fixed-term patent 
system the number of years of post-commercialization patent protection decreases 
monotonically with  t comm .
The intuition for this result, which was conjectured informally in Roin (2010), is 
as follows. Fix a level of  t comm , and consider an increase in post-commercialization 
patent life for inventions with this commercialization lag. This increase in patent 
protection has benefits and costs. The benefit is that more inventions with com-
mercialization lag  t comm will be commercialized at the margin; technically, we have 
increased  EML and hence made it more likely that equation (3) obtains. The cost is 
that, for inframarginal inventions that would have been pursued absent the increase 
in patent protection, there is more deadweight loss, for the standard reason that 
social value under monopoly is smaller than social value under perfect competition 
from generic entrants. The proof makes two key observations. First, the deadweight 
loss costs on the intensive margin are strictly decreasing with  t comm , both because 
the costs are pushed out further into the future and because the set of invention 
parameters for which private firms choose to commercialize is shrinking. Second, 
the benefits at the extensive margin are actually increasing with  t comm : for a private 
firm to be willing to commercialize an invention with higher  t comm , the invention 
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must be higher quality in the sense of higher private value  π —especially if the firm 
is excessively impatient—which in turn implies higher social value  v monop and  v .26 
Intuitively, when  t comm is large, the inventions at the margin are especially worth 
encouraging, and the cost of doing so is comparatively low. Hence, the larger is 
t comm , the larger should be post-commercialization patent life.
We wish to make four further remarks concerning this result. First, conditioning 
the length of patent award on  t comm should be feasible in practice, at least in the case of 
pharmaceuticals, since completion of FDA trials is intrinsically an observable event. 
Second, while we acknowledge that our assumption of constant social-to-private 
value ratios  v monop /π and  v/π is stylized, we note that the types of inventions that 
take longer to reach the market (e.g., treatments of early-stage disease and disease 
prevention) seem likely to have especially high such ratios. If these ratios increase 
with  t comm , then this increases the rate at which benefits at the extensive margin 
increase with  t comm , strengthening the result. Third, the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act27 
contains a provision granting some qualifying firms a partial extension of patent life 
based on the time that the drug spent in clinical trials. Specifically, the act awards 
qualifying firms an additional half-year of patent life for every year spent in clinical 
trials, up to a maximum of 5 years not exceeding 14 total years. Our result says that 
the Hatch-Waxman extension is directionally correct, but that optimal policy would 
go further. Finally, we are here abstracting away from strategic responses that could 
be “unintended consequences” from such a change in patent policy.28 In practice, 
awarding FDA-granted exclusivity periods that run from the date of FDA approval 
would likely accomplish the same goal, be administratively simpler to implement, 
and avoid unintended problems that could arise with revising the patent system.29
Our next result considers a more limited set of patent-design instruments than is 
allowed for by Proposition 6 and shows that there is still scope for improvement.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that the length of the patent term must be fixed, but that 
the patent clock can start either at invention or commercialization. Make the same 
assumptions regarding the distribution of invention parameters as in Proposition 6. 
Given any patent term that runs from the date of invention, there exists a patent term 
that runs from the date of commercialization that strictly increases social welfare. 
In particular, the optimal patent term that runs from the date of commercialization 
is superior to the optimal patent term running from the date of invention.
26 It is not necessary for the result that benefits at the extensive margin are weakly increasing with  t comm , only 
that they do not decrease too quickly (i.e., faster than do the deadweight loss costs on the intensive margin). For 
this reason, several of the assumptions in the proposition can be slightly relaxed. We have a numerical example, in 
which the density of the extensive margin is bimodal with a large decline between the two modes, which illustrates 
that the conclusion of the proposition is false if the density falls off too quickly. Intuitively, in the region in which 
the density on the extensive margins is very low, it is not sufficiently socially valuable to elicit inventions on the 
extensive margin to justify the deadweight loss costs for inventions on the intensive margin. 
27 Public Law 98-417 (1984)
28 More generally, we here restrict our attention to policy mechanisms that work within the existing patent 
system. More sophisticated policy mechanisms—for instance, in conjunction with the ideas in Kremer (1998) and 
Weyl and Tirole (2012)—could also be used. 
29 FDA exclusivity periods are currently granted to new drug applications (three years for new indications; five 
years for new molecular entities); to orphan drugs (seven years); and to pediatric approvals (six months). 
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Proposition 7 is useful for informing patent policy if it is possible to start the 
patent clock at commercialization, but difficult to condition the length of the patent 
award on the precise amount of time between invention and commercialization. 
As with the optimal policy considered above in Proposition 6, this more circum-
scribed policy proposal could be implemented via FDA-granted exclusivity periods 
as opposed to a restructuring of the patent system. A recent policy in the spirit of this 
result is a provision of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,30 which 
grants some qualifying drugs (specifically, biologic drugs) a 12-year exclusivity 
period running from the date of FDA approval, which runs concurrently with any 
remaining patent terms. Proposition 7 supports extending this type of post-approval 
exclusivity period to all drug approvals (but note that our analysis does not specify 
the optimal length of such an exclusivity period).
A caveat to the results in this section is that they presume that patents are an 
important way to incentivize research and development activity.31 If patents do not 
increase research investments, the policy responses analyzed in this section would 
be ineffective. Formally, consider an industry in which imitability  ι = 0 , so patents 
are not necessary to protect monopoly profits from projects. In such an industry, the 
modifications to patent design outlined in Propositions 5–7 will have no effect on 
R&D activity, although it is worth noting that in our simple framework these pol-
icy responses would not be harmful, only ineffective. By contrast, our other policy 
responses would be effective in such an industry provided that corporate short-ter-
mism is relevant ( η < 1 ).
Policy Lever: Targeted R&D Subsidies.—The logic that targeted R&D subsidies 
can improve social welfare is simple and standard. Take a particular invention that is 
not pursued by the private sector, but that would be pursued in the first-best world, i.e.,
(8)  EML · π < c < ETL · v . 
Suppose that the deadweight loss of taxation is  τ per dollar spent. Then, so long 
as the magnitude of the potential social gain is large enough relative to the magni-
tude of the private loss—that is, the magnitude of the first inequality in (8) is small 
relative to the magnitude of the second inequality in (8)—there is a potential for 
welfare-increasing intervention.
Recall that we defined an invention’s effective patent life as  EPL = p ∑  t comm   t patent −1 δ t , 
i.e.,  EPL is just like  EML except that it uses the social discount factor  δ rather than 
the private discount factor  ηδ . The condition for the existence of a socially beneficial 
R&D subsidy is:
(9)  EML · π < c and c + τ (c − EML · π) < EPL ·  v monop + (ETL − EPL) · v. 
In words, the conditions are that, first, the private firm would not commercialize 
on its own, and, second, that the social value from commercialization exceeds the 
30 Public Law 111-148 (2010).
31 As discussed in footnote 3, while patents have been controversial in many industries, a variety of sources of 
evidence suggest that patents are likely to be important in the pharmaceutical industry. 
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social costs—both the direct cost of commercializing,  c , and the deadweight loss 
cost of the required subsidy. Notice that the private firm’s commercialization deci-
sion (first without and then with the subsidy) depends on  EML , whereas the value 
society gets from the commercialized invention during the period it is under patent 
protection depends on  EPL .
While condition (9) can obtain for inventions with any commercialization lag, it 
is especially likely to obtain for inventions with large commercialization lags. This 
is because such inventions spend a larger proportion of their useful life off-patent, so 
it is more likely that on-patent life is not sufficient to incentivize private investment, 
while at the same time off-patent life is of sufficient importance that the value of 
public investment overcomes the deadweight loss of taxation. We can formalize this 
logic as follows.
PROPOSITION 8: Make the same assumptions regarding the distribution of inven-
tion parameters as in Proposition 6. Suppose that private firms make commercial-
ization decisions according to whether or not  EML · π + s ≥ c , where  s is an 
amount of government subsidy. Suppose that government R&D subsidies can be 
conditioned on  t comm but not on the other invention parameters. Then, for any target 
level of total subsidy expenditures, socially optimal subsidy policy requires that sub-
sidies are strictly increasing in  t comm .
The intuition for the proof of this result is similar to that for Proposition 6 on 
optimal patent length: the higher is  t comm , the higher is the quality of the marginally 
commercialized invention, and the smaller is the cost from needlessly subsidizing 
inframarginal inventions. As a policy matter, the most practical way to condition 
subsidies on  t comm might be to target subsidies at R&D that relates to treatment of 
early-stage disease and to disease prevention.
II. Data
Our empirical work focuses on cancer R&D for three reasons. First, unlike for 
many diseases, high-quality clinical data exists for cancer patients which accurately 
tracks patient-level characteristics such as survival time—a key variable needed for 
our analysis.32 Second, the existence of a standardized classification system for can-
cer—namely, standardized cancer organs of origin (such as breast and lung) and 
stages of cancers at the time of diagnosis (such as localized and metastatic)—facil-
itates a relatively clean match between aggregated patient-level clinical data and 
information on clinical trial investments relevant to different groups of patients. 
Such a match is possible in large part because cancer drug development tends to 
be specific to the organ and stage of the primary tumor: for example, Genentech’s 
drug Bevacizumab was approved by the FDA in 2004 for the treatment of patients 
32 The prostate cancer clinical trials discussed in the introduction illustrate why we would expect commercial-
ization lags to be longer for clinical trials enrolling patients with longer expected survival times: because clinical 
trials must generally show evidence that treatments improve mortality-related outcomes, trials tend to be longer 
when enrolling patients with longer survival times. In online Appendix A, we outline a power calculation of the type 
used to guide the design of clinical trials in order to fix ideas on this point. 
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with metastatic carcinoma of the colon and rectum.33 Cancer registry data records 
the organ and stage of the primary tumor at the time of diagnosis, thus allowing us 
to estimate the characteristics of patients (such as survival times) relevant to each 
cancer-stage. This mapping is of course imperfect: for example, the cancer 
registry data lacks the granularity required to precisely distinguish between 
hormone-receptor positive and hormone-receptor negative breast cancer patients. 
However, the level of clinical detail available in cancer registry data is remarkably 
complete relative to data available for other diseases. Finally, as discussed in the 
introduction, cancer is of interest from a substantive perspective given its high mor-
bidity and mortality burden.
Sections IIA, IIB, and IIC describe our datasets, and Section IID presents some 
basic summary statistics. Online Appendix B describes our data construction in 
more detail.
A. SEER Cancer Registry Data
The clinical data we use is a standard patient-level research database called 
the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) data, compiled by the 
National Cancer Institute (NCI) and available for the years 1973–2009 (SEER 
2012). SEER is considered the authoritative source of information on cancer inci-
dence and survival in the United States. The key variables we use for our analysis 
are the following:
Cancer and Stage of Patients.—Physicians diagnose cancer by the organ of ori-
gin and by stages that correspond to the extent of the disease’s spread at the time of 
initial diagnosis. We base our data construction on the standard SEER cancer classi-
fication system (including 80 cancer types) and the stage classification system that 
is most consistently available in the SEER data: localized, regional, and metastatic 
(listed in order of increasing extent of disease).34 In addition to constructing cancer-
stage- specific survival times, we also use information on the cancer and stage of 
diagnosis to construct a count of the number of patients diagnosed as a proxy for 
market size.
Survival Time.—SEER is administratively linked to follow-up mortality data from 
the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)—in our data, as of December 31, 
2009. Our primary measure of survival time is five-year survival, defined over all 
uncensored patient cohorts (1973–2004). We also use an early cohort of patients 
33 This overly simplified description glosses over several important issues, including off-label use of cancer 
drugs, which we discuss more in online Appendix B. 
34 For more details, see the SEER training website: http://training.seer.cancer.gov/ss2k/staging/review.html. We 
exclude in situ cancers from our analysis given that this category is relevant for only a few cancers (breast, cervical, 
and melanoma), but our results are similar if these cancers are included. Two other cancer categories are important 
but not monitored in the patient-level cancer registry data: remission and recurrence. A cancer is said to recur if it 
returns after being undetectable for a period of time, and the time during which the cancer is undetectable is referred 
to as remission. In general, recurrence is associated with poor survival prospects, but given that the cancer registry 
data do not monitor remission or recurrence, it is not possible to empirically assign a survival time to these groups 
of patients. Reflecting this data limitation, we do not examine trials enrolling only remission or recurrence cases in 
our analysis. As shown in panel B of Figure 1, in situ and recurrent cancers fit our model well: with excellent (poor) 
survival prospects corresponding to few (many) clinical trials, respectively. 
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(1973–1983) with minimal censoring in our construction of the life lost measure 
described below.
Basic Patient Demographics at the Time of Diagnosis.—We use the year of diag-
nosis together with information on patient sex and age at diagnosis to merge on 
year-age-gender specific life expectancy data from the NCHS. We combine this data 
on average life expectancy (in the absence of cancer) with our measure of observed 
survival time for the 1973–1983 cohort in order to estimate the life lost due to cancer 
for each patient.
B. National Cancer Institute Clinical Trials Registry
To measure R&D investments in cancer treatments, we construct a new clinical 
trials dataset drawing on data from the US National Cancer Institute’s Physician 
Data Query Cancer Clinical Trials Registry.35 The NCI registry was established in 
1971, and claims to be the most comprehensive cancer clinical trials registry. The 
intended purpose of the registry is to allow cancer patients and physicians to search 
for clinical trials currently accepting participants, and to allow them to access infor-
mation and results from closed trials.
The NCI registry was not developed as a research database and—to the best of our 
knowledge—has not previously been used as a data source by other researchers. The 
key advantage of the NCI registry for our analysis—relative to other clinical trials 
databases such as the NDA Pipeline data or the Pharmaprojects data—is the fact that 
the NCI registry explicitly lists which groups of patients (as defined by cancer type and 
stage at diagnosis) are eligible to participate in each clinical trial. This feature enables 
us to construct a measure of the number of clinical trials in which different groups of 
patients (as defined by cancer type and stage) are eligible to enroll, providing a metric 
of firms’ willingness to investigate candidate drugs on different groups of patients.
The NCI registry includes a handful of clinical trials with dates prior to 1973; 
we focus on trials from 1973 forward for consistency with the SEER registry data 
(which starts in 1973) and have data on trials through 2011. For a subset of clinical 
trials in our data, we observe whether the clinical trial was publicly sponsored or 
privately sponsored.
C. FDA Drug Approvals Data
While our main analysis focuses on the NCI clinical trials data, we also examine 
a dataset of the 71 FDA approved oncology drugs from 1990–2002 from Johnson, 
Williams, and Pazdur (2003). For 39 of these 71 drug approvals, we were able to 
hand-collect data on whether a surrogate endpoint was used, as well as the cancer 
and stage for which the drug was approved, from the Drugs@FDA database.36
35 Clinical trials are also used as a measure of R&D investments in Finkelstein (2004). 
36 Thirty-two of the approvals in the Johnson, Williams, and Pazdur (2003) list had no information available in 
the Drugs@FDA database on the indication for which the drug was approved, and we are not aware of an alternative 
source for this data. Given the coarse stage information that is included in the indication descriptions, we code stage 
for the drug approval data as “early,” “late,” or “not specified” (rather than localized, regional, and distant). In our 
sample of 39 approvals, 4 are coded as early stage, 25 are coded as late stage, and 10 are coded as not specified. 
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D. Summary Statistics for Cancer-Stage Level Data
We aggregate the patient-level cancer registry data and cancer clinical trials 
data into cancer-stage level observations. Our sample is constructed based on the 
80 cancer types underlying the SEER site recodes, and the three non-in situ stages 
underlying the SEER historic stage A variable: localized, regional, and metastatic. 
After accounting for the details of how staging varies across cancers, our bench-
mark cancer-stage sample includes 201 observations: 60 cancers appear for all 
3 stages (localized, regional, distant; 180 observations); prostate cancer is coded by 
SEER into 2 stages (localized/regional, distant; 2 observations); and 19 cancers are 
unstaged by SEER and hence only appear as 1 observation (19 observations).
Table 1 presents some basic summary statistics on our cancer-stage level data. 
Between 1973–2011, an average cancer-stage had roughly 1,000 clinical trials, 
but this average masks tremendous variation—ranging from a minimum of around 
200 to a maximum of over 7,000. Between 1990–2002, the median cancer-stage 
had no drugs approved, ranging to a maximum of 7. Using the number of patients 
diagnosed with a given cancer-stage as a rough measure of market size, on aver-
age a cancer-stage has around 12,000 diagnoses in SEER catchment areas between 
1973–2009, ranging from 100 to over 250,000. On average, the five-year survival 
rate (defined for cohorts diagnosed between 1973–2004, all uncensored cohorts) 
is 38 percent, but ranges from almost 0 to 94 percent. Finally, among trials report-
ing sponsorship data, around 75 percent report being publicly financed. Given that 
sponsorship data is missing for approximately one-half of our sample, it is difficult 
to know whether this is an accurate picture, or whether sponsorship is more likely 
to be reported for publicly funded trials relative to privately financed trials. While 
such systematic under-reporting of private sponsorship data could bias measure-
ment of the level or share of trials that are privately financed, we do not expect such 
Table 1—Summary Statistics: Cancer-Stage Data
Mean Median
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Number of clinical trials, 1973–2011 945 556 1,015 221 7,385
Number of drug approvals, 1990–2002 0.507 0 1.221 0 7
Five-year survival rate, cases diagnosed
 1973–2004
0.377 0.383 0.249 0.006 0.945
Number of diagnoses (1,000s),
 1973–2009
12.423 3.159 29.429 0.010 252.593
Estimated years of life lost (1,000s), 
 1973–1983
114.433 35.663 233.576 0.583 1,658.804
Share of trials privately 
 financed
0.258 0.265 0.062 0.122 0.507
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for our cancer-stage level data. The level of observation is the 
 cancer-stage. The clinical trials data is available from 1973–2011. The drug approvals data is available from 1990–
2002. The SEER data starts in 1973 and ends in 2009, which is why the number of diagnoses variable is measured 
over that time period. The five-year survival rate is calculated over patients diagnosed between 1973–2004, the 
cohorts for which five-year survival is uncensored as of 2009. The life years lost measure is calculated on cohorts 
diagnosed from 1973–1983 to minimize censoring, as explained in the text. As explained in the text, we suspect that 
sponsorship data is more likely to be reported for publicly funded trials relative to privately financed trials. All vari-
ables have 201 observations except for the life lost measure which has 192, because 9 cancer-stages had no patients 
diagnosed between 1973–1983. For details on the sample, see the text and online Data Appendix.
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under-reporting to vary systematically with our survival time measure: in which 
case, our empirical tests using sponsorship measures should still be valid.
III. Descriptive Analysis
A. Analysis by Stage
Panel A of Figure 1 plots two measures of clinical trial activity for each stage of 
cancer from 1973 to 2011 against the five-year survival rate of patients diagnosed 
with that cancer-stage from 1973 to 2004. Whereas metastatic cancer patients have 
a five-year survival rate of around 10 percent, the five-year survival rate for regional 
patients is around 50 percent, and for localized patients is about 70 percent. The 
 left-hand-side axis plots the corresponding number of clinical trials enrolling patients 
of each stage: metastatic cancer patients were the focus of nearly 12,000 clinical tri-
als in our data, whereas regional cancer patients were the focus of around 10,000, 
and localized patients around 6,000.
Dating back at least to Schmookler (1966), economists have hypothesized that 
market size would be an important determinant of the level of R&D investments. 
Several recent papers have provided evidence for this idea in the context of the 
pharmaceutical industry (Acemoglu and Linn 2004; Finkelstein 2004; Trusheim and 
Berndt 2012; Dubois et al. forthcoming). In our setting, a rough proxy for market 
size is the number of life-years lost from cancer. The right-hand-side axis plots the 
number of clinical trials enrolling patients of each stage, divided by the number of 
life-years lost from that stage as a rough adjustment for market size.37 This adjust-
ment does little to change the basic pattern.
Panel B of Figure 1 adds clinical trial counts for three other categories of dis-
ease for which the five-year survival rate is difficult to define: prevention trials, 
in situ cancers, and recurrent cancers. The bars are roughly positioned in order of 
increasing survival rates, for comparability with panel A of Figure 1. Very few clin-
ical trials aim to prevent cancer (less than 500) or to treat in situ cancers (less than 
200). In contrast, recurrent cancers have more trials than any other stage of disease 
(over 17,000).
B. Analysis by Cancer-Stage: Full Sample
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between our two key variables of interest 
in the full sample of cancer-stage observations: the five-year survival rate, and the 
number of clinical trials enrolling patients of that cancer-stage.38 For cancer-stages 
37 As described in Section II, life-years lost is measured as age-gender-year specific life expectancy (in the 
absence of cancer) in the year of diagnosis, less observed survival time in years, averaged over patients diagnosed 
with that cancer-stage between 1973–1983 (to minimize censoring) multiplied times market size. 
38 To give a visual sense of the data for a few major cancers, online Appendix Figure D.1 plots the relationship 
between the five-year survival rate and clinical trial activity for the “big four” cancers: breast, colon, lung, and pros-
tate. Online Appendix Figure D.1(a) plots the number of clinical trials enrolling patients of each cancer-stage, which 
decline with increases in the five-year survival rates. The points are labeled with the relevant cancer and stage, which 
enables a visual analysis of this relationship either within cancers (e.g., metastatic versus localized breast cancer) or 
within stages (e.g., localized lung cancer versus localized colon cancers). Online Appendix Figure D.1(b) adjusts 
the clinical trial count by the number of patients diagnosed as a rough adjustment for market size. Here, the down-
ward-sloping relationship between the survival rate and R&D investments is much more clearly visible. 
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with low survival rates, there is tremendous variation in the number of clinical 
 trials, with some cancer-stages having a very high number of trials. In contrast, for 
 cancer-stages with high survival rates, the distribution of clinical trial counts tends 
to be more compressed, and smaller in magnitude. The combination of these two 
patterns generates the downward-sloping relationship between the survival rate and 
R&D investments.
Table 2 formalizes this relationship between clinical trial activity and the 
five-year survival rate in a regression framework. For cancer-stage observation cs, 
we estimate the following:
(10)  Y cs = α + β S cs +  λ ′ X   cs +  ε cs  . 
The number of clinical trials  Y for the cancer-stage is the outcome variable, and 
the coefficient on the survival rate variable  S is the main estimate of interest. We 
investigate the robustness of this relationship by conditioning on various covari-
ates  X , described below. Reflecting the count nature of the clinical trials outcome, 
we show estimates from quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson models.39 We report 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the cancer level.
39 Estimates from ordinary least squares models using the log of the number of clinical trials as the dependent 
variable are essentially identical (estimates not reported). 
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Figure 2. Survival Time and R&D Investments: Cancer-Stage Data
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the five-year survival rate among patients diagnosed with each 
cancer-stage between 1973–2004 (the cohorts for which five-year survival is uncensored), and the number of clin-
ical trials enrolling patients of each cancer-stage from 1973–2011. Note that because we here count the number 
of clinical trials patients of each cancer-stage are eligible to enroll in, a higher count of trials appears here than 
in Figure 1 because many trials enroll patients of more than one cancer-stage type. The level of observation is the 
 cancer-stage. For details on the sample, see the text and online Data Appendix.
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Column 1 of Table 2 reports the raw correlation between the five-year survival 
rate and the number of clinical trials. The estimated coefficient implies that a 10 per-
centage point increase in the five-year survival rate is associated with a 8.7  percent 
decrease in R&D investments. Column 2 adds a rough market size control (measur-
ing the log of the number of patients diagnosed with that cancer-stage), which does 
not substantively change the estimate of interest. This market size variable is clearly 
an imperfect measure of demand. As one attempt to refine this measure, we construct 
a measure of life lost at the individual level—measured as age-gender-year specific 
life expectancy (in the absence of cancer) in the year of diagnosis, less observed sur-
vival time in years. At the individual level, this measure attempts to proxy for willing-
ness to pay, and summed across all individuals diagnosed with a given cancer-stage 
it may provide a more accurate measure of market size. Column 3 shows that the 
survival time-R&D correlation is similar if we condition on this alternative measure 
of market size. In Section IVA, we investigate the concern of unobserved heterogene-
ity in demand more directly. Figure 3 presents the visual analog of these regression 
specifications, residualizing the survival rate using our two measures of market size.
In an online Appendix, we present a number of additional robustness checks on 
this correlation. First, we ask whether the survival time-R&D correlation is similar 
when estimated within cancers (cancer fixed effects) and within stages (stage fixed 
effects). Online Appendix Table D.1 shows that the magnitude of the survival time-
R&D correlation is quite similar after conditioning on cancer fixed effects, stage 
fixed effects, or both.40 Second, we ask whether the survival time-R&D correlation 
40 For comparability, we omit the 19 unstaged cancers from the sample in this table since these observations 
do not identify the relationship of interest once we include cancer fixed effects and by definition unstaged can-
cers do not correspond to localized, regional, or metastatic stage definitions. Online Appendix Figure D.2 shows 
Table 2—Survival Time and R&D Investments: Cancer-Stage Data
Number of clinical trials (mean = 945)
(1) (2) (3)
Five-year survival rate −0.868*** −1.113*** −0.930***
(0.319) (0.286) (0.286)
log(Market size) — 0.243*** —
(0.055)
log(Life-years lost) — — 0.282***
(0.068)
Notes: This table shows the relationship between the five-year survival rate among patients 
diagnosed with each cancer-stage between 1973–2004 (the cohorts for which five-year sur-
vival is uncensored), and the number of clinical trials enrolling patients of that cancer-stage 
from 1973–2011. The level of observation is the cancer-stage. Estimates are from quasi- 
maximum likelihood Poisson models. Standard errors are clustered at the cancer level. “Market 
size” denotes the number of patients diagnosed with that cancer-stage between 1973–2009. 
“Life-years lost” denotes age-gender-year specific life expectancy (in the absence of cancer) 
in the year of diagnosis, less observed survival time in years, averaged over patients diag-
nosed with that cancer-stage between 1973–1983 (to minimize censoring) multiplied by mar-
ket size. The number of observations is 201 in columns 1 and 2, and 192 in column 3, because 
9  cancer-stages had no patients diagnosed between 1973–1983. For details on the sample, see 
the text and online Data Appendix.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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is robust to alternative measures of patient survival time. Online Appendix Table D.2 
shows that the estimated magnitude is quite similar using the one-year survival rate, 
as well as several parameterizations of a “pre-period” survival rate (1973 survival 
in years, the 1973 one-year survival rate, and the 1973 five-year survival rate). We 
focus on the five-year survival rate measured over a longer time period because we 
expect the survival rate to be more accurately measured on a larger sample, but the 
estimated magnitudes are not statistically distinguishable. Third, we investigate the 
robustness of the survival time-R&D correlation in various subsamples of the data 
in online Appendix Table D.3. The estimated correlation is quite similar, for exam-
ple, if metastatic cancers are excluded—suggesting that the observed correlation 
does not only reflect a high level of research on end-of-life patients. Finally, online 
Appendix Table D.4 confirms that the survival time-R&D correlation also holds in 
our sample of approved drugs.
IV. Interpreting the Correlation between Survival Time and R&D Investments
Section III documents what is, to the best of our knowledge, a new fact: R&D 
investments on cancer treatments are strongly negatively correlated with com-
mercialization lags, as proxied by survival rates. This fact is consistent with the 
idea that private firms may underinvest in long-term research, because we observe 
lower levels of R&D investment on inventions that require longer commercializa-
tion lags. However, by itself this fact is difficult to interpret for two reasons. First, 
other factors—such as heterogeneity in demand and heterogeneity in the costs of 
 residualized scatterplots corresponding to the regression specifications presented in online Appendix Table D.1 on 
this same sample. 
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Figure 3. Survival Time and R&D Investments: Residualized Cancer-Stage Data
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between residualized versions of the five-year survival rate among patients 
diagnosed with that cancer-stage between 1973–2004 (the cohorts for which five-year survival is uncensored), and 
the number of clinical trials enrolling patients of each cancer-stage from 1973–2011. The level of observation is the 
cancer-stage. Panel A residualizes market size; panel B residualizes life-years lost. Market size denotes the inclu-
sion of a covariate measuring the number of patients diagnosed with that cancer-stage between 1973–2009. Life-
years lost is measured as age-gender-year specific life expectancy (in the absence of cancer) in the year of diagnosis, 
less observed survival time in years, averaged over patients diagnosed with that cancer-stage between 1973–1983 
(to minimize censoring) multiplied by market size. For details on the sample, see the text and online Data Appendix.
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R&D—could generate the same qualitative pattern. On demand, while our regres-
sion analysis conditioned on indirect demand measures—such as market size and 
life-years lost—these variables may not capture the complex ways in which the 
survival rate may correlate with demand (see, e.g., Hammitt and Haninger 2010; 
Philipson et al. 2010). On costs, it could be, for example, that the science of treating 
cancer-stages with long commercialization lags is more difficult, and that observed 
low R&D investments reflect a paucity of scientific opportunities. Second, even 
if this correlation does reflect a causal effect of commercialization lags on R&D 
investments, it need not be evidence of a distortion, because the social planner is 
also more likely to pursue research projects that can be completed more quickly.
To address these concerns, in this section we document estimates from two addi-
tional empirical tests. First, in Section IVA we document causal evidence that short-
ening commercialization lags increases R&D investments. This evidence suggests, 
for example, that heterogeneity in demand is unlikely to explain the cross-sectional 
relationship between survival time and R&D. However, this test leaves open the pos-
sibility that the social planner and private firms symmetrically respond to commer-
cialization lags, and thus does not provide direct evidence of a distortion. Our second 
empirical test in Section IVB fills this gap by directly contrasting public and private 
R&D investments. Section IVC documents supporting qualitative evidence from 
historical case studies of FDA-approved chemoprevention drugs, which suggest that 
surrogate endpoints and public subsidies have played a key role in the development 
of chemoprevention drugs. Taken together, this body of evidence provides support 
for the idea that commercialization lags distort private R&D investments.
A. Investigating Surrogate Endpoints
If heterogeneity in demand for treatments or a paucity of scientific opportunities 
were driving the survival time-R&D correlation, the observed correlation should be 
independent of whether surrogate endpoints are used. In contrast, our model pre-
dicts that surrogate endpoints should make the survival time-R&D correlation less 
negative (Proposition 4). In this section, we document that there is not a negative 
survival time-R&D correlation in the sample of cancers allowed to use surrogate 
endpoints.41
As discussed by the US Food and Drug Administration (2007) and Johnson, 
Williams, and Pazdur (2003), the most clearly established non-mortality related 
endpoint is “complete response” for leukemias. A historical example is helpful in 
illustrating why this surrogate endpoint has been useful. Mukherjee (2010) chroni-
cles Sidney Farber’s 1948 discovery of chemotherapy, which was made in the con-
text of leukemia (Farber et al. 1948). While investigating folic acid deficiencies, 
Farber hypothesized that folic acid antagonists could be of value in treating can-
cer patients—paving the way for the development of modern chemotherapy drugs. 
Mukherjee’s (2010) account of Farber’s discovery argues that Farber was naturally 
inclined to test folic acid antagonists in the context of leukemia because white blood 
cell count monitoring offered an accepted method for testing whether the drug was 
41 As highlighted above, surrogate endpoints enable shorter trials, so this test does not provide direct evidence 
of a distortion; we address this issue in a separate test in Section IVB. 
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effective in pushing the disease into remission. While monitoring technologies have 
clearly progressed since Farber’s time, remission criteria in leukemias are still based 
on the same idea of blood cell counts and related bone marrow measures—outcomes 
which are generally agreed to closely correlate with improved survival. In addition 
to being used for monitoring, such measures have also been accepted by the FDA as 
the basis for approval of drug treatments for hematologic malignancies (leukemias 
and lymphomas; see Pazdur 2000 and Johnson, Williams, and Pazdur 2003).42
To investigate the effects of surrogate endpoints on R&D activity, we use both our 
clinical trials data and our drug approvals data.43 In the sample of approved drugs, 
we can confirm that hematological malignancies are more likely to be approved on 
the basis of surrogate endpoints: in our data, 92 percent of drugs approved by the 
FDA for hematological malignancies were approved on the basis of surrogate end-
points, relative to 53 percent of non-hematological malignancies.
We use these data to test three predictions of our model that relate to commer-
cialization activity. First, part (i) of Proposition 4 predicts that the use of surro-
gate endpoints should increase commercialization activity. To test this prediction, 
we ask whether—conditional on the five-year survival rate—hematological malig-
nancies have a larger number of clinical trials. The estimated coefficient in col-
umn 1 of panel A in Table 3 suggests yes: interpreting the coefficient on this binary 
independent variable ( β = 0.753 ) suggests a 112 percent increase in clinical tri-
als for hematological  malignancies relative to non-hematological malignancies 
 (( e β − 1) · 100 ≈ 112  percent ) . This pattern is robust to the inclusion of con-
trols for market size (columns 2 and 3). This result is consistent with the analysis of 
Trusheim and Berndt (2012), who observe that hematological malignancies have a 
larger number of clinical trials than would be expected based on their market size.
Second, Part 3 of Proposition 4 predicts that, if survival time is independent of 
the time required to show impacts on the surrogate endpoint, then the use of sur-
rogate endpoints should reduce the negative relationship between survival time 
and R&D investments. Third, in cases where surrogate endpoints do not decrease 
 commercialization lag, our model implies that surrogate endpoints should not 
change R&D incentives. That is, for cancers that have a short commercialization 
lag even in the absence of using a surrogate endpoint, the option to use a surrogate 
endpoint should not change R&D incentives. Empirically, this means that we expect 
hematologic and non-hematologic cancers to have similar levels of R&D for the 
set of cancers that have short commercialization lags even in the absence of using 
surrogate endpoints (that is, for low survival time cancers).
42 Based on our reading of these FDA writings, our understanding is that both scientists and regulators have 
viewed the surrogate endpoints used for hematologic cancers as valid and uncontroversial. Although far from defin-
itive, our empirical evidence in Section V is consistent with this view, suggesting that the additional R&D invest-
ments induced by the use of these surrogate endpoints have translated into improved survival gains. 
43 We use this drug approvals data in part to address a measurement error concern that could arise with our 
clinical trials data. Namely, the automated coding of our clinical trials data into cancer types (as detailed in online 
Appendix B) could be less reliable for hematologic malignancies relative to other forms of cancer if text searches 
for organ names (“breast,” “prostate,” etc.) are more accurate than our text searches for different forms of leukemias 
and lymphomas (the names of which tend to be more complex). While we aimed for the highest possible accuracy 
in cleaning the clinical trials data, because of the large sample size our cleaning of that data must be automated. In 
contrast, because there are a small number of drug approvals, we can hand-code the cancer types relevant to each 
drug approval, reducing concerns about measurement error. 
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To test these second and third predictions we estimate the following specification, 
where  H c is an indicator for hematological malignancies
(11)  Y  cs = α + β  S  cs · H  c + γ  H  c + δS  cs +  λ ′ X  cs +  ε cs  . 
Panel B in Table 3 presents these estimates. In contrast to the negative cor-
relation between the five-year survival rate and the number of clinical trials for 
 non- hematological malignancies ( δ ), we estimate a positive coefficient on the inter-
action term ( β )—consistent with the second prediction of our model.44 This  estimate 
44 Interpreting the interaction term in this nonlinear model requires transforming the coefficient; the interac-
tion coefficient of 2.266 in the first row of panel B implies that an increase in the five-year survival rate of 10 
percentage points predicts an increase in the number of trials for hematologic cancers that is greater than that of 
 non-hematologic cancers by 300 trials (about 30 percent relative to the mean), and applying the delta method to 
Table 3—Surrogate Endpoints, Survival Time, and R&D Investments
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Level of R&D, dependent variable: number of clinical trials (mean = 945)
Five-year survival rate −0.865*** −1.108*** −0.933***
(0.310) (0.284) (0.283)
(0/1: hematologic) 0.753*** 0.578*** 0.466**
(0.185) (0.176) (0.201)
log(Market size) — 0.231*** —
(0.057)
log(Life-years lost) — — 0.261***
(0.073)
Panel B. Composition of R&D, dependent variable: number of clinical trials (mean = 945)
(Five-year survival rate) × (0/1: hematologic) 2.266*** 2.140*** 1.963***
(0.408) (0.541) (0.613)
Five-year survival rate −1.122*** −1.309*** −1.133***
(0.343) (0.297) (0.303)
(0/1: hematologic) −0.077 −0.216 −0.261
(0.189) (0.228) (0.252)
log(Market size) — 0.226*** —
(0.056)
log(Life-years lost) — — 0.253***
(0.073)
Notes: This table shows two analyses of how cancer R&D differs on hematologic malignancies relative to other 
cancers, as a way of shedding light on how surrogate endpoints—which are more commonly used for hemato-
logic malignancies—affect R&D investments. Panel A regresses the number of clinical trials enrolling patients of 
that cancer-stage from 1973–2011 on the five-year survival rate among patients diagnosed with each cancer-stage 
between 1973–2004 (the cohorts for which five-year survival is uncensored) and an indicator for hematological 
malignancies. Panel B regresses the number of clinical trials enrolling patients of that cancer-stage from 1973–2011 
on the five-year survival rate among patients diagnosed with each cancer-stage between 1973–2004, an indicator 
for hematological malignancies, and an interaction between these two variables. The level of observation is the 
cancer-stage. Estimates are from quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson models. Standard errors are clustered at the 
cancer level. “Market size” denotes the number of patients diagnosed with that cancer-stage between 1973–2009. 
“Life-years lost” denotes age-gender-year specific life expectancy (in the absence of cancer) in the year of diagno-
sis, less observed survival time in years, averaged over patients diagnosed with that cancer-stage between 1973–
1983 (to minimize censoring) multiplied times market size. The number of observations is 201 in columns 1 and 
2, and 192 in column 3, because 9 cancer-stages had no patients diagnosed between 1973–1983. For details on the 
sample, see the text and Data Appendix.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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is robust to the inclusion of controls for market size (columns 2 and 3). This contrast 
in survival time-R&D correlations across hematologic and non-hematologic cancers 
is presented graphically in Figure 4.45
With respect to the third prediction of our model, we find that the estimated coef-
ficient on the indicator variable for hematologic cancers is, statistically speaking, 
zero, and also relatively small in magnitude. In addition to being consistent with 
our model, this result is also important as a test of a key assumption underlying 
this counterfactual exercise: namely, that hematologic cancers and non-hematologic 
cancers would have similar R&D investments but for the more frequent use of surro-
gate endpoints for hematologic cancers. A priori, hematologic and non-hematologic 
cancers are very different for many reasons—for example, the science of treating 
hematologic cancers might be simpler for some reason. However, to the extent that 
such differences are common across all hematologic cancers, hematologic cancers 
with low five-year survival rates should have higher levels of R&D investments than 
do non-hematologic cancers with low five-year survival rates. But that is not what 
we see in the data: rather, hematologic and non-hematologic cancers have similar 
levels of R&D investments for the patient groups where surrogate endpoints should 
not change R&D incentives. This evidence is consistent with the “all else equal” 
assumption behind this hematologic/non-hematologic comparison.
obtain a standard error for this interaction term provides a t-statistic of 5.99. Figure 4 gives an alternative sense of 
the magnitude of the coefficients obtained from a linear model. 
45 Online Appendix Table D.5 shows that this pattern of results also holds in the drug approvals data. 
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Figure 4. Surrogate Endpoints, Survival Time, and R&D Investments
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between five-year survival rate among patients diagnosed with each can-
cer-stage between 1973–2004 (the cohorts for which five-year survival is uncensored), and number of clinical trials 
enrolling patients of each cancer-stage from 1973–2011, separately for hematologic and non-hematologic cancers. 
The level of observation is the cancer-stage. For details on the sample, see the text and online Data Appendix.
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What can we learn from this counterfactual exercise? We draw two conclusions. 
First, from the perspective of testing the model, our estimates are consistent with 
the idea that neither unobserved heterogeneity in demand nor a paucity of scientific 
opportunities is driving the observed negative survival time-R&D correlation in the 
full sample. Second, from a policy perspective our estimates support the idea (ana-
lyzed in Proposition 4) that valid surrogate endpoints may increase R&D invest-
ments, particularly on long-horizon R&D investments. The key caveat to interpreting 
this evidence as a test of our theoretical model is that because surrogate endpoints 
change the length of clinical trials, both the social planner and private firms should 
choose to increase research investments. Hence, this test does not provide direct 
evidence of a distortion; our second empirical test in Section IVB fills this gap by 
directly contrasting public and private R&D investments.
In online Appendix A, we use this hematologic/non-hematologic compari-
son to provide a rough back-of-the-envelope estimate of the semi-elasticity of 
R&D investment with respect to a one-year change in commercialization lag: 
 ∂  (R&D investment ) / ∂  (commercialization lag) .46 Our main estimates of this 
semi-elasticity range between 7–23 percent.47 It is worth noting that this elasticity 
is itself of policy relevance, as an input into how firms would be expected to respond 
to decreases in commercialization lags as provided by mechanisms such as FDA 
priority review vouchers (Ridley, Grabowski, and Moe 2006).
B. Investigating Publicly Financed Clinical Trials
Our second empirical test directly contrasts public and private R&D investments. 
Consistent with our theoretical model, we document that commercialization lags 
reduce both public and private R&D investments. But also consistent with our 
model—and consistent with the conjectured distortion—we will see that the com-
mercialization lag-R&D correlation is quantitatively and statistically significantly 
more negative for privately financed trials relative to publicly financed trials.
As a first analysis of our trial sponsorship data, panel A of Figure 5 presents the 
cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of clinical trial lengths in the trial-level 
data, separately for privately financed and publicly financed trials. The privately 
financed CDF lies above the publicly financed CDF at almost every clinical trial 
length. The vertical line at 20 years denotes the length of the fixed patent term: 
consistent with the idea that the patent system should offer zero incentive to develop 
drug compounds that take longer than 20 years to develop, very few trials in our 
data have a reported length of 20 years or longer. Of the approximately 120 clinical 
trials longer than 20 years that have non-missing data on sponsorship, essentially 
100 percent are publicly funded.48
46 As described in online Appendix A, obtaining this semi-elasticity estimate requires scaling our estimate 
of how R&D investment changes in response to a change in the five-year survival rate ( ∂  (R&D investment ) / 
 ∂  (5-year survival rate) ) by an estimate of how a change in the five-year survival rate translates into a change in 
commercialization lag ( ∂  (commercialization lag) / ∂  (5-year survival rate) ). 
47 We are not aware of any existing estimates against which this estimate can be compared. 
48 The longest privately financed trial in our data lasts 18.66 years, with the exception of six trials that are 
reported to last longer than 60 years. We suspect that these six trials have typographical errors in their start dates, 
but have not yet heard back from the sponsor (Bristol-Myers Squibb) in an inquiry on this point. If these six trials 
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Panel B of Figure 5 provides a second analysis of this sponsorship data, plotting 
the relationship between the five-year survival rate and the share of clinical trials 
enrolling patients of that cancer-stage which are privately financed.49 The down-
ward-sloping relationship is quantified in panel A of Table 4: a 10 percentage point 
increase in the five-year survival rate is associated with a 1.2 percent decrease in the 
share of clinical trials that are privately financed. The magnitude of this coefficient 
is quite similar conditional on our market size controls (columns 2 and 3).
Panel B of Table 4 presents estimates from a second test of how public and private 
R&D investments differ. Estimating equation (10) separately on the sample of pub-
licly financed trials and on the sample of privately financed trials, we would like to 
compare the estimated  β coefficients to see whether the correlation between survival 
time and clinical trial activity is smaller in the sample of publicly financed trials 
relative to the sample of privately financed trials. Formally equivalent to estimating 
these two regressions separately is estimating a stacked regression where the unit 
of observation is a cancer-stage-type cst (where type is either privately financed or 
publicly financed)
(12)  Y  cst = α + βS  cs · T  t + γT  t + δS  cs +  λ ′ X  cs · T  t +  ε cst  . 
Our  T t variable is defined as an indicator which equals 1 for observations count-
ing privately financed trials, and equals 0 for observations counting publicly 
financed trials. The coefficient of interest  β measures the difference in the survival 
have typographical errors as we expect, then 100 percent of the trials with non-missing data on sponsorship that are 
longer than 20 years are publicly funded. 
49 In interpreting the scale of the graph, recall that as noted in Section IID we suspect that sponsorship data is 
more likely to be reported for publicly funded trials relative to privately financed trials. 
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Figure 5. Survival Time and Financing of Clinical Trials
Notes: This figure shows two analyses of how public and private financing of clinical trials differ. Panel A plots the 
cumulative distribution function of clinical trial length in years, omitting the handful of observations with length 
greater than 30 years for improved readability. The level of observation is the clinical trial. The vertical line at 
20 years denotes the length of the fixed patent term. Panel B plots the relationship between the five-year survival 
rate among patients diagnosed with each cancer-stage between 1973–2004 (the cohorts for which five-year survival 
is uncensored), and the share of clinical trials enrolling patients of that cancer-stage from 1973–2011 that were 
privately financed. The level of observation is the cancer-stage. For details on the sample, see the text and online 
Data Appendix.
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 time-clinical trial activity correlation observed for privately financed trials relative 
to that observed for publicly financed trials.
These estimates are presented in panel B of Table 4. The negative  β estimate 
implies that the relationship between the five-year survival rate and R&D invest-
ments is more negative for privately financed trials relative to publicly financed 
trials—consistent with what we expected based on the analyses in panel B of 
Figure 5. Interpreting the point estimate in column 1 suggests that a 10 percent-
age point increase in the five-year survival rate results in an additional 4.4 percent 
decrease in privately financed clinical trials, in addition to the 8.6 percent decrease 
observed for publicly financed clinical trials. These estimates imply that the rela-
tionship between survival time and clinical trial activity is on the order of 35 percent 
Table 4—Survival Time and Financing of Clinical Trials
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Share of clinical trials that are privately financed (mean = 0.258)
Five-year survival rate −0.122*** −0.134*** −0.119***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
log(Market size) — 0.009 *** —
(0.003)
log(Life-years lost) — — 0.008***
(0.003)
Panel B. Number of clinical trials (mean = 244)
(Five-year survival rate) × (0/1: private) −0.436*** −0.500*** −0.470**
(0.166) (0.171) (0.195)
Five-year survival rate −0.866*** −1.097*** −0.932***
(0.314) (0.287) (0.285)
(0/1: private) −0.681*** −0.723*** −0.833***
(0.062) (0.054) (0.081)
log(Market size) — 0.230 *** —
(0.063)
log(Market size) × (0/1: private) — 0.003 *** —
(0.002)
log(Life-years lost) — — 0.257***
(0.076)
log(Life-years lost) × (0/1: private) — — 0.001***
(0.000)
Notes: This table shows two analyses of how public and private financing of clinical trials varies with patient sur-
vival time. Panel A shows the relationship between the five-year survival rate among patients diagnosed with each 
cancer-stage between 1973–2004 (the cohorts for which five-year survival is uncensored), and the share of clinical 
trials enrolling patients of that cancer-stage from 1973–2011 that were privately financed; the level of observation 
is the cancer-stage, and estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) models. Panel B shows the relationship 
between the five-year survival rate and the number of publicly/privately financed clinical trials enrolling patients 
of that cancer-stage from 1973–2011; the level of observation is the cancer-stage-sponsor (where sponsor is either 
public or private), and estimates are from quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson models. Standard errors are clustered 
at the cancer level. “Market size” denotes the number of patients diagnosed with that cancer-stage between 1973–
2009. “Life-years lost” denotes age-gender-year specific life expectancy (in the absence of cancer) in the year of 
diagnosis, less observed survival time in years, averaged over patients diagnosed with that cancer-stage between 
1973–1983 (to minimize censoring) multiplied by market size. The number of observations is 201 in columns 1 and 
2 of panel A, 402 (= 201 × 2 sponsor types) in columns 1 and 2 of panel B, 192 in column 3 of panel A, and 384 
(= 192 × 2 sponsor types) in column 3 of panel B, because 9 cancer-stages had no patients diagnosed between 
1973–1983. For details on the sample, see the text and online Data Appendix.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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larger for privately financed clinical trials relative to publicly financed clinical trials 
( 4.4/(4.4 + 8.6) ≈ 35 percent). The point estimates and their ratio are quite stable 
across specifications adding our market size controls (columns 2 and 3).
We wish to make two remarks concerning these estimates. First, this  public-private 
contrast is consistent with two potential models of public sector decision making: 
the public sector could have a different objective function than the private sector 
(as in our model), or the public sector could be compensating for underinvestment 
by the private sector. Both models are consistent with the existence of a distortion, 
and thus have the same qualitative interpretation, but the quantitative interpretation 
of the estimates would differ across the two models. Second, to the extent that a 
large share of publicly financed clinical trials investigate new uses of existing drugs, 
publicly financed trials may be constrained by science to mirror privately financed 
R&D investments.
C. Historical Case Studies of FDA-Approved Chemoprevention Drugs
As a complement to our empirical analyses, we also document qualitative (case 
study) evidence on what motivated the development of existing chemoprevention 
drugs. Because cancer prevention trials typically examine cancer incidence as an 
outcome variable, we expect cancer prevention technologies to generally require 
long trials and thus to also be subject to our conjectured distortion. We start with 
the list of all six FDA approved chemoprevention drugs compiled by Meyskens et 
al. (2011). Our qualitative investigation of the history of these FDA drug approvals 
suggests that all six of these approvals either relied on the use of surrogate end-
points, or were approved on the basis of publicly financed clinical trials. Table 5 
documents a summary of our work in online Appendix E, which provides docu-
mentation for this assertion, and we here focus on briefly summarizing two of the 
case studies. First, the drug Tamoxifen was FDA approved for several cancer indi-
cations while on-patent; later, a publicly funded clinical trial supported the 1998 
FDA approval of Tamoxifen as a chemoprevention agent, preventing breast cancer 
incidence in high-risk groups. Second, the recent FDA approval of cervical cancer 
vaccines relied on the use of human papillomavirus (HPV) incidence as a surrogate 
endpoint for cervical cancer incidence. Hence, the evidence from these case studies 
is quite consistent with the conjectured distortion: we expect cancer prevention trials 
to have long commercialization lags, and no cancer prevention technologies have 
been privately developed without relying on surrogate endpoints.
V. Estimating the Value of Life Lost Due to Commercialization Lags
In this section, we leverage our surrogate endpoint variation from Section IVA 
to estimate counterfactual improvements in cancer survival rates that would have 
been observed if commercialization lags were reduced.50 Importantly, this  exercise 
should not be interpreted as quantifying the size of our conjectured distortion, 
because as discussed surrogate endpoints generate social value beyond eliminating 
50 While we would ideally quantify R&D-induced improvements in both morbidity and mortality, given data 
constraints we here focus on estimating the extent to which R&D increases patient survival. 
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the distortion. As with our back-of-the envelope estimates of the semi-elasticity of 
R&D investment with respect to changes in the commercialization lag, this exercise 
is directly policy relevant as an input into how firms would be expected to respond 
to decreases in commercialization lags as provided by mechanisms such as the 
application of valid surrogate endpoints or FDA priority review vouchers (Ridley, 
Grabowski, and Moe 2006).
Figure 6 illustrates how we use variation in surrogate endpoints (across hemato-
logic and non-hematologic cancers) to estimate counterfactual survival gains from 
1973–2003. Panel A of Figure 6 illustrates our conceptual framework. If there had 
been no survival improvements between 1973 and 2003, all cancer-stage observa-
tions would locate along the 45-degree line (“no progress line”); in contrast, if all 
cancer-stages had been cured between 1973 and 2003, all cancer-stage observations 
would locate along the horizontal line where 2003 survival rates equal 1 (“cure can-
cer line”). As discussed in Section IVA, we expect two patterns to emerge when con-
trasting survival improvements across for hematologic and non-hematologic cancers. 
First, survival improvements should be similar for hematologic and  non-hematologic 
cancers in cases where surrogate endpoints do not shorten commercialization lags 
(that is, for cancers with low 1973 five-year survival rates). Second, the difference in 
survival improvements between hematologic and non-hematologic cancers should 
increase in commercialization lag (that is, increase in the 1973  five-year survival 
rate). Reflecting these predictions, the line marked “non-hematologic cancers” coin-
cides with the line marked “hematologic cancers” at 0 percent survival, and the gap 
between the two lines increases as commercialization lag increases.
Panel B plots the observed 2003 five-year survival rates against the 1973 five-
year survival rates. Strikingly, the data matches our illustrative figure in panel A 
remarkably well. In particular, the linear fit lines for hematologic cancers and 
non-hematologic cancers meet for cancers with a very low 1973 five-year sur-
vival rate; the linear fit for hematologic cancers is close to a parallel shift of the 
45-degree line (slightly steeper, as expected based on Figure 4); and the linear fit for 
 non- hematologic cancers is much more shallow in slope. Note that given the dearth 
of quasi-experimental evidence documenting that increases in pharmaceutical R&D 
translate into improved survival (see, e.g., Lichtenberg 2012), this evidence that the 
additional R&D  investments induced by shorter commercialization lags (by relying 
Table 5—Historical Case Studies of FDA-Approved Chemoprevention Drugs
Approval
indication
Surrogate
endpoint used?
Primarily publicly
funded?
BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin) bladder carcinoma in situ no yes
Diclofenac squamous cell carcinomas yes no
Celecoxib familial adenomatous polyposis
(FAP)-related cancers
yes  no
Photofrin esophageal carcinoma yes no
Tamoxifen breast cancer no yes
Cervical cancer vaccines cervical cancer yes no
Notes: This table summarizes our qualitative investigation of the history of all six FDA drugs approved as cancer 
prevention (chemoprevention) drugs. The key point of this table is to illustrate that all six of these approvals either 
relied on the use of surrogate endpoints, or were approved on the basis of publicly financed clinical trials: no chemo-
prevention drugs have been privately developed in the absence of relying on surrogate endpoints. See the descrip-
tions in Section IVC and online Appendix E for more details.
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on surrogate endpoints) translated into improved survival gains is itself of substan-
tive interest.51
The area between the linear fit line for hematologic cancers and the linear fit 
line for non-hematologic cancers can be used to quantify the number of life-years 
that would have been gained if commercialization lags for non-hematologic can-
cers had been similar to commercialization lags for hematologic cancers. We for-
malize this estimation for the cohort of US cancer patients diagnosed in 2003 as 
follows. First, on the sample of hematologic cancers, we predict the 2003 five-year 
survival rate as a function of the 1973 five-year survival rate. Second, for the sam-
ple of non-hematologic cancers we use the estimated  β from the hematologic can-
cers survival regression to predict a counterfactual 2003 five-year survival rate for 
 non- hematologic cancers had commercialization lags for non-hematologic cancers 
been similar to commercialization lags for hematologic cancers. Third, we calculate 
51 Welch, Schwartz, and Woloshin (2000) and others have argued that although five-year survival is a valid 
measure for comparing cancer therapies in a randomized trial, changes in five-year survival rates over time may be 
biased by changes in diagnosis patterns (known as “lead-time bias”). For example, an expansion in mammography 
screening between 1973 and 2003 could have led to breast cancers being diagnosed at an earlier stage, which would 
have mechanically increased measured five-year survival rates even if there was no real change in patient health. 
In our context, changes in diagnosis would be expected to bias us away from finding that hematologic cancers saw 
larger gains in survival between 1973 and 2003 because the cancers that saw increases in screening over this period 
(such as breast and prostate cancer) are non-hematologic cancers. Empirically, if we construct an alternative version 
of panel B of Figure 6 that plots the preferred outcome variable of Welch et al.—the percent change in mortality 
from 1973 to 2003—against the 1973 five-year survival rate, we observe a very similar pattern to that displayed 
in panel B: first, hematologic cancers on average had larger percent improvements in mortality from 1973 to 2003 
than did non-hematologic cancers; second, as predicted by our model there is no gap between the hematologic and 
non-hematologic lines for patient groups with near-zero 1973 five-year survival rates; and third, the gap between 
the hematologic and non-hematologic lines increases in magnitude as the 1973 five-year survival rate increases. 
Taken together, these results suggest that changes in diagnosis patterns are not generating the differential patterns of 
survival changes across hematologic and non-hematologic cancers presented in panel B of Figure 6. 
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Notes: This figure illustrates how we use variation in surrogate endpoints (across hematologic and non-hematologic 
cancers) to estimate counterfactual survival gains from 1973–2003 that would have been observed had commer-
cialization lags for non-hematologic cancers mirrored the shorter commercialization lags realized for hematologic 
cancers. Panel A illustrates our conceptual framework. Panel B illustrates the empirical analog of panel A, plotting 
the 1973 five-year survival rate against the 2003 five-year survival rate. The level of observation is the cancer-stage. 
For details on the sample, see the text and online Data Appendix.
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δ cs , the  difference between the counterfactual and actual 2003 five-year survival 
rates, for each non-hematologic cancer-stage; on average,  δ cs is 13.2 percentage 
points. Fourth, we convert each  δ cs into a number of life-years lost per person based 
on the fact that, in our data, a change from 0 to 1 in the five-year survival rate 
corresponds to a gain of 8.1 additional years of life. Applying this conversion, the 
average  δ cs of 13.2 percentage points corresponds to  (8.1)(0.132) = 1.07 life-years 
per cancer patient. Fifth, we multiply each cancer-stage estimate of per-person life-
years lost by the number of US cancer patients diagnosed in 2003 with that can-
cer-stage. We compute the number of patients in each cancer-stage using the SEER 
data, scaling up (dividing by 0.074) to account for the fact that SEER does not cover 
the entire US population. In total, this calculation suggests that among this cohort 
of patients—US cancer patients diagnosed in 2003—the longer commercialization 
lags required for non-hematologic cancers generated around 890,000 lost life-years.
If we value each lost life-year at $100,000 (Cutler 2004), the estimated value of 
these lost life-years is on the order of $89 billion per annual patient cohort. Applying 
a conservative social discount rate of 5 percent and assuming that patient cohorts 
grow with population growth of 1 percent, the net present value of the life-years at 
stake is  $89 billion/(0.05 − 0.01) = $2.2 trillion .52
It is important to note that this life-lost estimate is rough at best. Our point esti-
mate of the value of life lost per annual patient cohort is $89 billion, with a 95 per-
cent confidence interval that ranges from $7 billion to $172 billion; the net present 
value point estimate of $2.2 trillion has a 95 percent confidence interval that ranges 
from $170 billion to $4.2 trillion.53
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether private firms underinvest in long-term 
research projects. Our theoretical model clarifies how two factors—corporate 
short-termism and the structure of the patent system—may generate incentives that 
distort private research investments away from inventions that have both a long use-
ful life and a long commercialization lag. We then investigate this distortion empir-
ically in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, where drugs treating patients 
with short life expectancies can move through clinical trials more quickly than can 
drugs treating patients with longer life expectancies. Using a newly constructed 
dataset on cancer clinical trial investments, we provide several sources of evidence 
which together are consistent with commercialization lags distorting private R&D 
investments away from drugs to prevent or treat early-stage cancers.
We use our theoretical model to analyze the innovation and social welfare conse-
quences of three policy interventions which could address this distortion: a policy 
change that would allow firms to rely on surrogate endpoints in clinical trials, a 
52 Note that other authors, such as Murphy and Topel (2006) and Weitzman (1998), have argued that a social 
discount rate of 2 percent or lower may be more appropriate; using such lower values would of course increase our 
estimate of the net present value of life-years at stake. 
53 To be conservative, we compute these confidence intervals using HC3 standard errors rather than robust 
standard errors, given the expected downward finite sample bias of robust standard errors in this small sample of 
hematologic cancers (see, e.g., the discussion in Angrist and Pischke 2009). The analogous 95 percent confidence 
interval using robust standard errors is $15 billion to $164 billion (a net present value range from $365 billion to 
$4.1 trillion). 
2081Budish et al.: do firms underinvest in long-term research?vol. 105 no. 7
 patent design change that would start the patent clock at commercialization, and 
R&D subsidies targeting projects with long commercialization lags. While surrogate 
endpoints and targeted R&D subsidies would address the distortion regardless of the 
source, the patent design change only addresses the fixed patent term distortion.
Empirically, we document evidence, consistent with our theoretical model, that 
surrogate endpoints appear to increase R&D investments on innovations that would 
otherwise have long commercialization lags. We also use this surrogate endpoint 
variation to estimate counterfactual improvements in cancer survival rates that 
would have been observed if commercialization lags were reduced. We estimate 
that among one cohort of patients—US cancer patients diagnosed in 2003—longer 
commercialization lags resulted in around 890,000 lost life-years. Valuing these lost 
life-years at $100,000 (Cutler 2004) suggests that the estimated social value of the 
life-years lost in this one cohort of patients is on the order of $89 billion per year. 
This evidence suggests that, in the case of hematologic cancers, apparently-valid 
surrogate endpoints were effective in increasing R&D investments on innovations 
that would otherwise have had long commercialization lags, and that the resulting 
increases in R&D translated (in this case) into real gains in patient health. While 
much attention has been focused on the risks and costs of using surrogate endpoints 
that may imperfectly correlate with real improvements in patient health, our anal-
ysis is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to use the historical record to 
quantify how the availability and use of a valid surrogate endpoint affected R&D 
allocations and patient health outcomes.
The example of the Framingham Heart Study is helpful in illustrating the poten-
tial value of surrogate endpoints. Heart disease is the leading cause of death in the 
United States, but since 1968 the age-adjusted rate of deaths from heart disease has 
dropped by 50 percent.54 Although some of these gains are due to lifestyle changes, 
much of the decline in heart disease has been attributed to improved pharmaco-
logical preventives and treatments for cardiovascular disease, including the devel-
opment of beta-blockers, ACE-inhibitors, and statins (Weisfelt and Zieman 2007). 
Patients use these drugs to reduce the morbidity and mortality from heart disease, but 
very few of these drugs reached the market based on clinical trials using morbidity 
or mortality as the endpoint. Rather, almost all were approved based on evidence 
that these drugs lowered either blood pressure or LDL (low-density lipoprotein) 
cholesterol— outcomes that can be measured much more quickly than morbidity 
and mortality (Psaty et al. 1999). These surrogate endpoints were first identified by 
the Framingham Heart Study, a large-scale, multi-decade, federally funded observa-
tional study which found that high blood pressure and LDL cholesterol are critical 
risk factors in cardiovascular disease. Subsequent clinical trials helped to validate 
these prognostic factors, which led the FDA to accept them as surrogate endpoints 
in cardiovascular trials (Meyskens et al. 2011). Researchers have argued that with-
out these surrogate endpoints, it is unclear whether drugs such as beta-blockers, 
ACE-inhibitors, and statins would have reached the market as treatments for heart 
disease (Lathia et al. 2009; Meyskens et al. 2011). Note that public subsidies —such 
as federal support for the Framingham study—were likely important in this context, 
54 See, for example, the discussion in Cutler and Kadiyala (2003). 
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because any individual firm’s investment in discovering and validating surrogate 
endpoints would generate benefits that largely spill over to other firms. Both our 
empirical evidence on the effects of surrogate endpoints for hematologic cancers and 
this historical case study for heart disease suggest that research investments aimed 
at establishing and validating surrogate endpoints may have a large social return.55
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